



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND FATA INTEGRATION
INTO THE NATIONAL MAINSTREAM**

by

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September 2012

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE September 2012	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Information Operations and FATA Integration into the National Mainstream			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mohsin Abbas Malik				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This paper analyzes the multifaceted problem of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with a view to suggesting viable options to integrate tribal areas of Pakistan into the national mainstream and a role that can be played by information operations (IO) in achieving this integration. The paper discusses historical background and provides an overview of administrative, judicial, political, and socioeconomic aspects of issues and addresses impact of military operations within the area. The launching of military operations in the FATA after 9/11 became a necessity; their impact is discussed at length to determine remedies and applications of strategies and tools to achieve the smooth integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. In assessing underlying causes, this study suggests that a significant change to the status quo is essential and effective measures must be taken to initiate tribal area integration to safeguard wider national and international interests. The role of IO, i.e., non-kinetic, non-lethal options, to include application of tools and capabilities is analysed with respect to achieving FATA integration into the national mainstream. This research is focused on a more cohesive strategy of integration and future vision of integrating the FATA into the national mainstream by applying modern IO tools.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Pakistan, Tribal System, Information Operations, Information Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Military Deception, Combat Camera.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 141	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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**INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND FATA INTEGRATION INTO THE
NATIONAL MAINSTREAM**

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**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN
INFORMATION WARFARE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING**

from the

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the multifaceted problem of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with a view to suggesting viable options to integrate tribal areas of Pakistan into the national mainstream and a role that can be played by information operations (IO) in achieving this integration. The paper discusses historical background and provides an overview of administrative, judicial, political, and socioeconomic aspects of issues and addresses impact of military operations within the area. The launching of military operations in the FATA after 9/11 became a necessity; their impact is discussed at length to determine remedies and applications of strategies and tools to achieve the smooth integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. In assessing underlying causes, this study suggests that a significant change to the status quo is essential and effective measures must be taken to initiate tribal area integration to safeguard wider national and international interests. The role of IO, i.e., non-kinetic, non-lethal options, to include application of tools and capabilities is analysed with respect to achieving FATA integration into the national mainstream. This research is focused on a more cohesive strategy of integration and future vision of integrating the FATA into the national mainstream by applying modern IO tools.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BHU	Basic Health Units
COMCAM	Combat Camera
C2	Command-and-Control
C4/ISR	Command, Control, Communication and Computers/ Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CND	Computer Network Defense
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CI	Counterintelligence
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DSPD	Defense Support Public Diplomacy
EM	Electromagnetic
EA	Electronic Attack
EP	Electronic Protection
EW	Electronic Warfare
ES	Electronic Warfare Support
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
FR	Frontier Region
FRC	FATA Reforms Committee
IA	Information Assurance
IO	Information Operations
IW	Information Warfare
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
MMA	Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MILDEC	Military Deception

NFC	National Finance Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OPSEC	Operations Security
Pak–Afghan	Pakistani–Afghan
PA	Political Agent
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PA	Public Affairs
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
POAT	PSYOP Assessment Team
P&D	Power and Development
SAFRON	Ministry of State and Frontier Regions
SPD	Strategic-Planning Division
TA	Target Audience

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The “Federally Administrated Tribal Areas” (FATA) is a territory that, according to the constitution of Pakistan, belongs to Pakistan, but enjoys a special status within the country. It is a hilly and far-flung territory alongside the Durand Line, now the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Figure 1). It occupies an area that is approximately the size of Belgium and stretches 450 kilometers along the border with Afghanistan. According to the national census, it has a population of 5.7 million people on the Pakistani side of the border, as compared to the overall population of Pakistan, which is 187.34 million (per July 2011 estimates). The cutting into two parts of a territory belonging to one and the same tribe was among the reasons that this line, since its creation by the colonial powers, has caused so much trouble and been a bone of contention, especially after creation of the state of Pakistan.

The FATA consists of seven agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan) and six frontier regions (FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Lakki, FR Tank, and FR D.I. Khan). These agencies/regions have a semiautonomous status and are administered through a special law, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901. The British colonial rulers who were responsible for the establishment of this law and the special status attached to the area had their own imperial considerations and aims in designing and keeping it like this. Unfortunately, Pakistan, after gaining independence, chose to carry on the imperial policies and thereby denied the status of full rights and citizenship to the people of the FATA. This is even more deplorable because Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (the founding father of Pakistan) had ordered the ending of the “forward policy” devised by the British. This led to the voluntary declaration of loyalty to Pakistan by the tribes, which had earlier refused to accept British suzerainty. Disregarding the quaid’s order, successive Pakistani governments since 1947 never altered their conduct and did not take the initiative to develop an alternative policy for the region.

FATA inhabitants have no fundamental rights as enjoyed by the rest of the people of Pakistan. In the past, no significant change in the socioeconomic structure of tribal areas could be brought about. The lack of job opportunities has turned this region into a smugglers' paradise. Drug trafficking and gunrunning have become the main occupation of many inhabitants of the region. The FATA is also a sanctuary for kidnapers, car thieves, and other criminal elements. Government efforts to bring the tribal areas within the folds of the normal law of the land have achieved poor results. The tribal culture and customs have strongly resisted any change in the system. Today, the tribal areas need major governmental attention through revolutionary reforms in social, economic, cultural, judicial, political, and related fields. The fruit of modern and representative administration needs to be extended to the population in these areas.

The attack of 9/11 and subsequent events have thrust the tribal regions into the international limelight. In order to address domestic as well as international concerns, the military has launched operations in specific areas of the tribal belt to flush out foreign terrorists and outlaws. Security imperatives demand a quick and early improvement in the situation and a lasting solution to the FATA conundrum.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I bow my head with extreme humility to God Almighty for providing me with an opportunity to excel in my educational career at such a prestigious institution, the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. I am in debt to the Pakistani army for placing confidence in my abilities and for their support in enabling me to undertake this challenge. I owe gratitude to the Naval Postgraduate School, since it is one of the best-accredited institutions of the world. It is one of the most conducive environments for learning and enhancing educational skills. I am equally grateful to the NPS faculty that helped me in refining my thought process and equipped me with educational tools that will keep enlightening my path in times to come. I am enormously thankful to my thesis advisor, Professor Steve Iatrou, an information-operations expert, and co-thesis advisor, Professor Ed Fisher, an electronic-warfare expert, in facilitating and guiding me to write on a topic that has complex dimensions. Their backing allowed me not only to undertake this challenge, but their timely “mid-course corrections” helped me complete my thesis in the manner I had planned. I am deeply indebted to them, since their help, stimulating suggestions, knowledge, experience, and encouragement helped me at all times in the study and analysis of the project and in the pre- and post-research period.

I would like to acknowledge and extend my heartfelt gratitude to my superb wife, Sobia Mohsin, and my very loving and adorable daughters, Abeeha, Aleeya, Ajeeha, and newborn Zahra. In spite of my academic commitments, they facilitated the completion of my thesis in good time. My thesis would simply not have been possible without their support. Their patience and understanding was a constant support and motivation that inspired me to finish my thesis well within my set timelines.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is a vast tract of land that lies along the sensitive Pakistani–Afghan (Pak–Afghan) border and accounts for 27,220 square kilometres, or 3.4 percent of Pakistan's land area. Under the 1973 constitution, the FATA is separate from the province within which it lies, and although the constitution decrees that “the state shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens,”¹ it later allows for the operation of a distinct and different set of laws to operate within these areas. Figure 1 shows a map of the FATA.




Figure 1. Map of the FATA

¹ Syed Raza, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973* (GF Printing Press, 1973), 73.

Since the creation of Pakistan, the tribal areas continue to maintain a special political and administrative status within the country. Under this special status, the area is governed arbitrarily through the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) Act of 1901. Government efforts to bring the tribal areas within the folds of the normal laws of the land have achieved some results, but tribal culture and customs have strongly resisted any significant change in the system. Today, the tribal areas require major governmental attention through revolutionary reforms in education, the judiciary, and health and communication facilities. In addition, the fruits of modern and representative administration need to be extended to the population of the region.

The attacks on the United States on 9/11 and subsequent events have thrust the tribal regions into the international limelight. To address domestic as well as international concerns, military operations in specific areas of the tribal belt were launched to flush out foreign terrorists and outlaws. However, a segment of tribal society, i.e., a small percentage of the population who are either religiously misled or have criminal connections with local and international players in the region, has a stake in continuing to exploit the government and people of the FATA. These elements continue to be a hindrance to establishing law and order by government security agencies. They also garner support from countries hostile to Pakistan.

The status of the FATA and its proximity to the Pak–Afghan border poses a unique challenge to Pakistan on a number of levels. Historically an arena for imperial competition and possible invasion route, the area has since been used as a launch point and conduit for the exercise of influence in Afghanistan. It has more recently emerged as a source of terrorist and criminal activity that threatens Pakistan's national security. The region also has geopolitical and growing economic significance, in that it is a potential route for the economic development of the emerging Central Asian states. On the ideological level, the continued semiautonomous status of the region poses a direct challenge to the integrity of Pakistan as a nation-state, and through militancy threatens the government's

efforts towards economic and social development. Thus, there is a requirement to fully integrate these strategically important but neglected areas into the national mainstream, while addressing the problems prevalent there. To cogently address this problem, this thesis has been divided into the following chapters.

- Chapter I provides an introduction to the thesis and its contents.
- Chapter II explains the geography, historical background and rediscovered importance of the FATA.
- Chapter III discusses existing administrative, judicial and political systems of the tribal areas and their impact on socioeconomic conditions in the area.
- Chapter IV analyzes security implications in relation to ongoing military operations.
- Chapter V presents overall analysis and draws conclusions.
- Chapter VI focuses on the feasibility of applying information-operations tools for smooth integration of the FATA into the national mainstream.
- Chapter VII offers measures and recommendations.

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II. GEOPOLITICAL SETTING

The spectacular land in which the Pathans live has had a major effect on their history and their way of life.²

— J.W. Spain

A. GEOGRAPHICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan lies to the northwest of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and borders Afghanistan. It is a narrow tract of land 1200 km in length and 130 km at its widest point. Geographically, the tribal area lies on the apex of three of the highest mountain ranges in the world: the Hindu Kush, Pamir and the Karakoram ranges³. Administratively, the FATA is divided into seven political agencies: Khyber, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, and into six frontier regions: Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, D I Khan and Tank⁴ (see appendixes A, B and C). The FATA is inhabited by various Pashtun tribes who follow the ancient code of Pukhtunwali in their day-to-day affairs (see appendixes B and D). The tribal psyche hinges on sensitivities based on tribal traditions, or *riwaj*, and religious sentiments, which are often intermingled in a complex manner.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The tribal form of society has persisted in a landscape that lay across the passage of countless invaders, including Alexander (356 BC. 310 BC), Genghis Khan (1162–1227) and Tamerlane (1336–1405).⁵ The people of the FATA have

² James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), 21.

³ David Ditchers, *The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 2.

⁴ Mumtaz Ali, "The Political and Administrative Development of Tribal Areas" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Peshawar: Area Study Centre Central Asia, 1996), 3.

⁵ Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1958), xxi.

defended their homeland against all sorts of adventures⁶ and misadventures and have remained fiercely independent.⁷ Except for Aurangzeb, all other rulers of the Mughal dynasty followed a policy of conciliation, desisting from all direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of the area.⁸

Consequent to the annexation of the Punjab and present-day North-West Frontier Province in 1849, the British slowly gained access within the FATA. The northwest-frontier tribal belt presented a difficult problem for the British, i.e., with regard to how to prevent the tribesmen from plundering British territory and how to defend India against any possible Russian aggression⁹. With this in mind, the British tried different methods to administer the area. A “closed-door policy” of non-interference in the affairs of the area¹⁰ gave way to the “forward policy” of direct administration of the area on or about 1876.¹¹ The international boundary between British India and Afghanistan, earlier known as the Durand Line, was demarcated in 1893. During British rule, the socioeconomic conditions within the FATA remained stagnant.¹² The Durand Line agreement’s broad contours are reflected in Appendix E for better comprehension of the overall environment.

With the independence of Pakistan, tribesmen as a whole expressed their popular will to join the new nation.¹³ The tribes were assured of a continuation of agreements¹⁴ between the tribes and the British government by Quaid-e-Azam

⁶ *Imperial Gazetteer of India, North-West Frontier Province* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979), 13-15.

⁷ Caroe, *Pathans*, xxii.

⁸ Badshah Gul Wazir and Jehangir Khan Mohamand, *Futuristics of Tribal Administration* (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1995).

⁹ *IPRI Islamabad*, Paper, March 10, 2005.

¹⁰ Lal Baha, *N.W.F.P, Administration under British Rule, 1901-1919* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 5.

¹¹ Caroe, *Pathans*, 370.

¹² Akbar S. Ahmed, *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society* (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1987), 15.

¹³ Mehrunnisa Ali, *Pak-Afghan Discord: A Historical Perspective 1855-1979* (University of Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 1990), 114.

¹⁴ *Government of Pakistan, Revised Agreement with the Tribal People* (Peshawar, 1947), 70.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah¹⁵ (see Appendix F). However, there were no fundamental changes in administrative, judicial and political policies. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the FATA came into the limelight.¹⁶ The influx of Afghan refugees, spread of militant culture, continuing civil war in Afghanistan and rise of the Taliban did much to aggravate the situation.¹⁷ These factors led to an altered ethnic balance, weapons proliferation, an influx of narcotics, stoppage of development works, a worsened law-and-order situation¹⁸ and desanctification of the international border. Following the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, the tribal areas again came into focus as a large number of foreign militants found refuge there,¹⁹ necessitating a cleanup operation. Military operations and their aftermath have brought to the fore the lingering problems of the tribal areas.

C. THE REDISCOVERED IMPORTANCE OF THE FATA

The region has always been significant in a geopolitical and an economic sense. However, the present regional milieu has accorded a new importance to the FATA because of the ongoing war on terror. Moreover, the requirement to access the developing markets of the Central Asian states and Afghanistan by opening up new trade routes, exploiting natural resources, extending gas pipelines and pursuing the overall development of Pakistan itself have given an entirely new prominence to the FATA. In view of these developments and their effects, it has become increasingly important for Pakistan to integrate the FATA into the mainstream of Pakistani politics, administration and society.

¹⁵ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, eds., *Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Challenges and Response* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 30.

¹⁶ Ali, "Political and Administrative," 77.

¹⁷ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsood ul Hasan Nuri, *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 42.

¹⁸ Ibid., 49.

¹⁹ Aslam Effendi, "Civilizing Waziristan," *The News*, April 9, 2004, 7.

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III. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF TRIBAL AREAS

A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE FATA

With the termination of the British Raj in India in 1947, Pakistan secured, through its political agents in the tribal agencies, an agreement with the tribal chiefs, or *maliks*. Included within the agreement was a commitment to maintain existing internal arrangements in the tribal areas.²⁰ To provide a legal and constitutional cover to these agreements, the governor general of Pakistan issued a series of orders and notifications under which the tribal areas were declared part of Pakistan, effective on 15 August 1947. The first constitution of Pakistan came into force on 23 March 1956 and did not bring any change in the political and administrative organization of the tribal areas. The 1973 constitution of Pakistan created special provisions in articles 246 and 247 that gave special status to the tribal areas²¹. For details, see appendixes B and G. Because of these agreements and provisions, acts of the national and provincial assemblies and the judicial powers of the state are not automatically applicable to these areas²².

B. PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

The administrative and judicial systems in the tribal areas intermingle and hinge on the troika of the jirga system, the political agent (PA), and the FCR of 1901. The ministry of state and frontier regions (SAFRON) in Islamabad is responsible for administrative affairs and development activities in the area. The governor of the NWFP, as an agent to the president and representing the federal

²⁰ *Government of Pakistan, Revised Agreement with the Tribal People* (Peshawar, 1947).

²¹ *The Constitution of Pakistan, As Amended up to 10th January, 1988*, Compiled by Sheikh Ebrahim (Lahore: Pakistan Educational Press), 131-135.

²² Humayun Khan, *The Role of the Federal Government and the Political Agent, Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 105.

government, administers the tribal areas²³ through the FATA secretariat. Figure 2 presents the pattern of administration.




Figure 2. FATA Administration²⁴

1. Administrative and Judicial Institutions in the Tribal System

a. Political Agents

The political agent (PA) was an innovation of the British in India²⁵. Today, the seven federally administered tribal agencies are administered by a political agent who combines administrative, judicial and diplomatic roles. He has at his disposal a whole array of benefits apart from the *khasadars*, or government local security employees, and frontier corps, or Civil Armed Forces personnel. An organizational outline of the political agent's office is given below.

²³ Cheema, et. al., *Federally Administered*, 49.

²⁴ Muhammad Tayyab Ghafoor, "Impediments in the Integration of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the National Mainstream of Pakistan," December 2009, accessed on July 16, 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512301>.

²⁵ Khan, *The Role of the Federal*, 107.




Figure 3. Political Agent Organization²⁶

b. The System of Maliks and Lungi Holders

Each tribe has its traditional elders, known as *maliks*, who represent their tribe²⁷. *Lungis*, or turbans, are awarded to some loyal and influential individuals for rendering services to the government.²⁸ There are a total of 3,616 maliks and 3,441 lungi holders in the FATA and frontier regions²⁹. The maliks and lungis are influential within the populace of the FATA.

c. The Jirga System and its Types

The *jirga* is an assembly of tribal elders where disputes are taken for amicable settlement, and decisions are given on the basis of *riwaj*.³⁰ *Riwaj* is synonymous to local cultural values. There are three main types of jirgas.³¹ The *sarkari jirga* is nominated by the political agent to settle intertribal disputes, the

²⁶ Ghafoor, "Impediments in the Integration."

²⁷ Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, "Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Response," address, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005.

²⁸ Adilla Rehman, Anwar Ali Shah, Shahid Bashir and Raja Muhammad Abbas, "Viability of Extending Fiscal Laws to the Tribal Laws," (research paper, Lahore: National Institute of Public Administration 2004), 8.

²⁹ "Federally Administered Tribal Areas," accessed on June 2, 2012, http://www.khyber_gateway.com, June 2012.

³⁰ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Circled in Controversy," *Newsline*, August 2002.

³¹ "Federally Administered."

qaumi jirga is formed by the tribe itself to settle intratribal issues and the *shakhsi jirga* is formed at the request of and by the disputing individuals themselves.

d. The FATA Secretariat

The FATA secretariat was established in the year 2000. The secretariat concentrates all directorates of line departments, sections of power and development (P&D) and the finance department under one organization. The federal government, through SAFRON and the governor's secretariat, makes allocation of funds utilized by the FATA secretariat for the agencies.

2. Frontier Crime Regulations and the System of Law Enforcement in the FATA

The political administration maintains law and order in the FATA through frontier-crimes regulations, which are enforced by the frontier corps and khasadars, and placed at the disposal of the PA³². The FCR of 1901³³ excludes the technicalities of the ordinary law³⁴ and recognizes modern principles governing the dispensation of justice³⁵. Details of major problem areas in the FCR are reflected in appendix H.

C. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE TRIBAL AREAS

The politics of the FATA must be viewed as a complex interplay of tribal, economic, cultural, religious, and even criminal activity that no single index can accurately measure. Certainly such an attempt is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some of the major features are described in the following paragraphs.

³² Azmat Hayat Khan, *Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Response* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 95.

³³ Talat Sattar, "Frontier Crime Regulations: A Draconian Law Against Tribal People," accessed on June 2, 2012, <http://www.PakistanLink.com>.

³⁴ Spain, *Pathan Borderland*, 29.

³⁵ Amir Mahmoud Khan, "Justice Denied," *Newsline*, December 2004.

1. Political Parties

Except for religious parties like Jamait i Islami and Jamiat i Ulemai Islam, who use the umbrella of religion to hold their meetings, other nonreligious and secular political parties are barred from undertaking political activities in the FATA since the introduction of the 1935 Indian Act³⁶. The situation has not changed in the new millennium. Recently on 10 January 2005, the governor secretariat issued a notification that asked administrations to enforce a complete ban on political activities and barred NWFP ministers and MMA leaders from the tribal region.

2. System of Representation

The FATA used to have a restricted mode of franchise where only maliks and lungi holders could vote for candidates for the national assembly³⁷. However, on 14 December 1996, the right of universal suffrage was granted to tribal members. At present, twelve members from the FATA represent their people in the national assembly, i.e., the lower house, whereas eight seats are reserved for FATA members in the senate, i.e., the upper house.

3. Political Initiatives Taken by the Government

Apart from the grant of universal adult franchise to tribals in 1996; i.e., to all upstanding citizens eighteen or older, except lunatics, aliens, bankrupts and criminals, without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, caste or language; no major steps were taken to address the political situation in tribal areas before 2001. Major political initiatives taken by the government after 2001 are given below.

³⁶ Nayar Zaman Momand, "The Tribal Question," *The Frontier Post*, July 10, 1996.

³⁷ "Adult Franchise for FATA," *Dawn Karachi*, February 11, 1994.

a. Political Reforms

The present government constituted a FATA Reforms Committee (FRC) to consider some of the political options. The FRC recommended a number of measures, including implementation of a plan for devolution of power, amendments to the FCR and improvement in the security situation,³⁸ all of which are being implemented.

b. Devolution of Power

Although the local-government plan of 2000 did not initially envisage application of the system to the FATA, the government decided to extend it to the tribal areas in January 2002³⁹. The major decisions taken by the government for the devolution of power for the FATA are reflected in Annex J⁴⁰.

D. OVERALL SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Socioeconomic conditions play a significant role in shaping people's minds. Deprivation of basic amenities has left people of these regions vulnerable to exploitation by anti-state elements. A thorough understanding of these conditions will help in formulating a comprehensive information-operation plan. FATA is declared as the least developed area of Pakistan,⁴¹ with one of the lowest per-capita incomes⁴². Some of the basic facts having a bearing on the socioeconomic situation are:

³⁸ U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Pakistan: Focus on Tribal Reforms," accessed on September 25, 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org>.

³⁹ Mumtaz Ali Bangash, *FATA Reforms Committee Revised Report on the Introduction of Local Government Plan 2000 in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Pakistan and Proposed FATA-Regulation 2001*.

⁴⁰ Ansar Abbasi, "Tribal Areas to Get Devolution Plan," *The News*, January 24, 2002.

⁴¹ Rehmatullah Khan Wazir, "FATA has been ignored over the last five decades, 74th Advanced Course In Public Sector Management" (research paper, Karachi: National Institute of Public Administration, 2002), 8.

⁴² Masud Idrees, "Changing Patterns of the Economy in Tribal Areas Adjoining North-West Frontier Province (Pakistan)," (Ph.D. thesis, Peshawar: University of Peshawar, Area Study Centre Central Asia, 1992), 125.

1. Population

The total population of the FATA is 3.176 million, with an annual growth rate of 2.19%⁴³. Government estimates show that as much as 60% of FATA households are below the poverty line⁴⁴.

2. Literacy Rate

The region has a literacy rate of 17.4%, which is significantly lower than the national average of 45%.

3. Existing Infrastructure

Unfortunately, the tribal areas have always been ignored in regard to infrastructure⁴⁵. The meager number of schools, healthcare facilities, communication infrastructure and allied services cannot support any major economic venture. Approximately 80% of the funds allocated for the FATA are consumed on non-developmental charges to maintain the bureaucracy⁴⁶.

4. Water and Irrigation

Water for sustenance and irrigation is a major need. A mere 44% of the population has access to clean drinking water⁴⁷. A brief overview of present socioeconomic conditions in the FATA is included in appendixes K, L, M, N and O.

⁴³ Population Census Organization, *Census Report 1998* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan).

⁴⁴ Donneth Walton, "Technical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for preparing FATA Rural Development Project, Report by Asian Development Bank," accessed on July 2, 2012, http://www.adb.org/documents/TARs/PAK/tar_pak33268.pdf.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁶ Rashid A. Khan, "Command and Staff College Quetta," lecture, August 15, 2005.

⁴⁷ Walton, "Technical Assistance," 2.

E. MAJOR SOURCES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THEIR POTENTIAL

1. Agriculture

Agriculture forms a sizeable portion of the economic activity in the area. Due to various factors, agricultural productivity is below the subsistence level. A low level of mechanization, communal ownership of land in the tribal system, insufficient irrigation⁴⁸ and inadequate use of pesticides results in low yields per acre. Details of agriculture in the FATA are given at Annex P.

2. Livestock

Livestock is also of vital economic importance in the FATA. However, due to nonscientific methods of animal husbandry, desired outputs are not available. Details of livestock in the FATA are attached as Annex Q.

3. Forests

Some areas in the FATA have a large amount of timber and other forest resources. Deforestation, use of valuable timber as fuel and degradation of grazing lands has resulted in the loss of income opportunities⁴⁹.

4. Minerals

The tribal areas possess vast deposits of numerous minerals. Inadequate geological surveys, poor security environments and tribal disputes over mineral-rich lands has not allowed for mineral exploration and adequate exploitation.

5. Trade

Trade has been major source of economic activity in the area. However, due to smuggling and other illegal practices, trade opportunities have dwindled over the years. Most of the tribesmen consider smuggling a legitimate business

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 3.

activity and call it their *tijarat*⁵⁰, i.e., business. However, the real beneficiaries are the big mafias who control the trade⁵¹.

6. Overseas Employment

Labor by FATA residents in the countries of the Gulf region is another source of livelihood and revenue for the FATA, through remittances of income back to the region. With increasing competition in overseas markets, this source of monetary remittances is also dwindling.

F. EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM ON THE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS

The FATA comprises some of the least developed areas of Pakistan. What little has been provided for development has either been squandered or become a victim of the prevalent administrative and political system. Thus, the tribal areas today are mired in poverty, leading to social problems and criminal activities⁵². Of late, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements have exploited this situation to their advantage.

One of the major reasons for the survival of Al Qaeda elements in South Waziristan Agency was their ability to pay huge sums of money to poor locals in return for provision of shelter. Therefore, it can be said that economic problems had a major role to play in the overall worsening of the security situation.⁵³

The integration of the FATA into the national mainstream is therefore possible only by taking cognizant measures to reduce poverty, promote human resource development and initiate reforms in the existing judicial, administrative, and political systems.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Naimutullah Khan, interview, Miranshah, North Waziristan, May 14, 2005.

⁵¹ Ali, "Political and Administrative," 176.

⁵² Aziz Sarwar, "FATA Ills Are Rooted in Economic Dependence," *Frontier Post*, August 24, 1996.

⁵³ Hameed Khattak, interview by author, Wana, South Waziristan, May 13, 2005.

⁵⁴ Moinuddin Haider, "Internal Security of Pakistan, Staff Course 2005," lecture, Command and Staff College Quetta, June 2, 2005.

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IV. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS IN RELATION TO THE ONGOING MILITARY OPERATION

A. BACKDROP TO MILITARY INTERVENTION

The conduct of military operations in the FATA, officially known as Operation Almizan, represents a significant departure from the security policy that had been in place since 1947. The stimulus for the change can be found in the need for uprooting extremism and criminal activity in the area, apart from pressure brought to bear on Pakistan by the U.S. in order to support its operations in Afghanistan. The militant and extremist presence in the area dates back to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. During the civil war in Afghanistan, groups like the Taliban and Al Qaeda established their roots in the area by appealing to the religious zeal and cultural sensitivities of a significant portion of the tribal people. They established their bases and tried to intermingle with the locals. The main interest of these groups rested in use of these remote and relatively lawless areas as safe havens for their extremist movements. They were able to create internal-security problems for Pakistan while using the local population as virtual hostages and resisting all government ingress. In view of this, the government of Pakistan considered it prudent to cleanse the Pakistani soil of unwanted elements present in the FATA. Today, Pakistan has stationed nearly 70,000 troops in the area⁵⁵. An additional 5,000 troops were deployed on the border in July of 2011, and 5,000 more troops were added before the Afghan parliamentary polls in September⁵⁶. In a stretch of over 600 kilometers, the Pakistani army has established 664 posts to stop cross-border infiltration.

B. EFFECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Initial phase of Operation Almizan unfolded synchronously with coalition-force operations in December 2001. When the Pakistani army initially

⁵⁵ *IPRI Islamabad*.

⁵⁶ Muhammad Safdar, *The News*, September 16, 2005.

entered the tribal areas, it was welcomed enthusiastically by the local populace. During this stage, due to the porous nature of the border and insufficient surveillance resources, a significant number of militants found refuge in the FATA, apart from previously existing elements in the area and started using these areas as bases for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. The second phase of the operation started once the Pakistani army moved into the North and South Waziristan agencies to flush out militant bases. Initially, the operation proceeded smoothly, but this phase culminated in mid-March 2004 when the frontier corps, the South Waziristan scouts, operation at Kalosha met stiff resistance⁵⁷. This first operation of Al Mizan was played out on television screens all over Pakistan. Kalosha II generated certain popular perceptions and forced a change in strategy. The militants started a comprehensive resistance strategy based on guerrilla tactics of ambush, raids, sniping, assassination and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From 11 June 2004 to date, a three-pronged strategy has been followed by the government. The main facets of this strategy included sealing of the border and sanitization of the area, creation of a suitable political environment and increased impetus of development projects. Presently, the overall security situation in the area has improved considerably and the opposition's freedom of action has been limited.

The entry of the Pakistani army to flush out foreign militants from the FATA has acted as a catalyst for sociopolitical change in the tribal areas. Some of the major effects of military operations are listed below.

1. Military/Security Impact

Given the relatively recent nature of military operations and the lack of authentic published sources, it is difficult to gather reliable data on military success or other relevant information. However, as a result of interaction with the

⁵⁷ Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, ed., *Fact Files: Operation Against Terrorists in South Waziristan* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 2.

locals by local operational commanders, it can be inferred that these operations have been able to effect a positive change in the security situation of the area while extending the writ of the government.

2. Political Impact and Local Perceptions

The impact of offensive military operations on the political environment of FATA is crucial. A return to normalcy and apparent popular participation in governmental development schemes can be used as a means of measuring political success. Resentment created in a segment of population against the army due to collateral damage can be considered the major negative effect⁵⁸. The militants have been able to draw on the sympathies of a portion of the population by appealing to their sensitivities with regard to hospitality and religion. At the macro-political level, these operations have aroused conflicting sentiments, because of disagreement by religious political parties and opposition⁵⁹. Most political parties do not favour military operations because of possible backlash by extremists and terrorists. Meanwhile, the local population is hostage to local miscreants because of traditional cultural themes, e.g., “to provide shelter, security and food to a guest or outsider is part of Pathan’s culture and social values.”

3. Development Activities

A major impact of the operation has been in the development works undertaken by the army, which have had a positive effect on socioeconomic conditions.⁶⁰ It has also made possible the entry of civil line departments and NGOs into the area. Details of some of the development activities are attached as Annex R.

⁵⁸ H. Jacob, *Observer Research Foundation (ORF)*, October 21, 2011.

⁵⁹ Behroz Khan, “Libyan hatched plot to kill Musharraf,” *The News*, March 16, 2004.

⁶⁰ Cheema, et. al., *Federally Administered*, 12.

4. Improved International Image of Pakistan

Pakistani efforts towards the elimination of terrorists in the FATA have increased the regional and international prestige of Pakistan. Coalition forces are keenly interested in the Pakistani army's operations in the FATA, as NATO leaders are of the view that the operation would have a positive impact on NATO's own operations inside Afghanistan⁶¹.

C. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR IO THEMES

Military operations may also have long-term security implications for Pakistan as a whole. If the overall government strategy is unable to isolate and control the problems within the FATA, they may translate into a protracted, low-intensity conflict for the country as a whole, and maybe even for the region. Military operations in the FATA can have the following security implications for Pakistan:

1. Increased Separatist Tendencies

Bruised egos, violated codes of honor, a resurgent Taliban, remnants of Al Qaeda, Pushtun fraternity in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the shared hatred for the US in the region can, in combination, increase the demands of separatism and elements of extremism in the region.

2. Effects on National and Army Morale

Domestically, an increased number of army casualties in the FATA will be an embarrassment to the government and military. The effects of continued casualties may also create morale problems directly for the troops.

⁶¹ "Military Operations in FATA," accessed on October 21, 2011, <http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthread.php?t=5266>.

3. Terrorist Acts in the Country

The ongoing operations may have the effect of inducing increased acts of violence by the terrorists with the help of collaborators and sympathisers within the country.

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V. ANALYSIS

Having described the overall political, administrative, socioeconomic and security environments, it is prudent to analyze the impact of these environments on the integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. In short, integration would mean administrative, political, ideological and socioeconomic integration with the rest of the country. Problem areas in these sectors and possible means of integration are analyzed in the succeeding paragraphs.

A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. Administrative System

The major problem areas in the administrative system of tribal areas are as follows:

- Absence of financial and judicial accountability by the political administration.
- Combination of judicial and executive functions in the PA, leading to many evils.
- Undue bureaucratic hurdles for the solution of petty problems, because of the various bottlenecks in the existing system of administration⁶².

2. Flaws in the Judicial System

- A concept of collective and territorial responsibility that is against the basis of justice.
- An absence of judicial checks on the PA and jirga because of the denial of the right of appeal.
- Violations of basic human rights by the FCR⁶³.
- Non-qualification of jirga members for the job, leading to overly simplistic decisions.

⁶² Ali Mumtaz Bangash, *The Political Administration of Tribal Areas; A Historical and Organizational Perspective* (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1998), 17.

⁶³ Khalid Aziz, *The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Administration of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Tribal Areas of Pakistan, Challenges and Response*. (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 117.

- Vulnerability of the jirga to power centers of wealth, social status and political influence.
- Delayed justice due to bureaucratic lethargy, as all major decisions are vetted by the PA.

3. Political Situation

The government-formed agency councils in 2002 reneged on their promise of elected local councils. As a result, most members of these councils are handpicked nominees of the government, like the maliks themselves. The unelected councils have further strengthened the existing corrupt system in the FATA and reinforce the peoples' distrust of the government.

B. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Modernization consists of displacing local dependence with dependence on external markets and by doing so, integrates the village community into the region, the nation, and, through foreign transaction, the rest of the world.⁶⁴

Interestingly, this view of economic development can also be adopted in the FATA as well. Therefore, it is imperative that the economic situation in the FATA be improved if a viable process of integration is to materialize.

1. Reasons for FATA Economic Backwardness

The backwardness of the FATA can be attributed to multiple reasons. Some of these are:

- The tribal nature of the society, which tends to isolate the area from outsiders⁶⁵.
- Social and political instability in the FATA, which has not allowed worthwhile socioeconomic activity and has deterred outside investors⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ Ainslie Embree, et al, *Pakistan's Western Borderlands* (Vikas, 1977), 87.

⁶⁵ Rehman, "Viability of Extending," 8.

⁶⁶ "Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment: Federally Administered Tribal Areas," policy briefing note, accessed on June 2, 2012, http://www.opml.co.uk/docs/07_FATA_Policy_Briefing_Note.pdf.

- Lack of clear government policies, which allow for very few developmental works.
- An influx of refugees, which has brought a severe strain to the economy of the area.
- Maliks and tribal elders who do not allow development for fear of loosening their hold on tribal people.
- The constitutional position of the FATA, which restricts development, as no checks exist on the maliks and the political administration responsible for proper utilization of development funds.

C. THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

The challenges posed by the FATA go beyond immediate threats associated with the international war on terrorism. The following list of shortfalls can be observed in the overall conduct of military operations at the micro and macro levels.

- Lack of effective media campaigns to counter the propaganda of miscreants.
- Inadequate intelligence setup.
- Lack of adequate training and equipment for army units and law enforcement agencies operating in the area.
- Absence of a coordinated long-term strategy, except disjointed development works, for winning the hearts and minds of the people
- Inadvertent strengthening of the maliki system by overreliance on maliks.
- Ad hoc stationing of the army in different areas.
- An ineffective dialogue process with political parties and local people.
- Lack of physical barriers to restrict movement across borders.
- Inadequate measures to prevent collateral damage.

D. OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR INTEGRATION OF THE FATA

Various options are mentioned below, along with an analysis of each.

1. Option 1, Independent and Autonomous Status with Modifications in the FCR and Administrative System

This option is an improved status quo. Problems in the judicial and administrative systems will be partially addressed and changes will bring about some amount of administrative efficiency and effectiveness. However, this option is a continuation of the existing system against the will of the masses and will only provide a short-term solution.

2. Option 2, Creation of a New Province by Amalgamating the FATA and FRs

In this option, tribes will have their own government in their own area. Multifarious complications related to merger will be minimized and tribes will maintain their identity under provincial autonomy. However, the FATA lacks geographical continuity and natural resources; therefore, this option is not economically viable. It will strengthen subnationalists in other provinces and will not be supported by the people of the NWFP because of the splitting of the Pashtun population. The purpose of integration will not be fully realized.

3. Option 3, Progressive Political Merger into the NWFP

This implies a gradual integration of the FATA into the NWFP through the instruments of massive development and political changes. At the same time, a phased approach would be adopted by first merging the PATA, followed by FRs and finally the FATA, with the provincial government of the NWFP. It suits the social and cultural homogeneity of the FATA and the NWFP and will have no shock-action effect because of its gradual nature. However, this process will be time consuming, thereby necessitating a strong will of the government to continue the policy. This solution will be relatively slow, while the ground situation demands rapid overhaul of the judicial systems and a better law and order environment, to restore people's confidence in the government and its will to find a lasting solution to the FATA quagmire.

4. Option 4, Agency-Wise Integration Strategy

In this option, the merger of the PATA and FRs with the NWFP is envisioned, to be carried out immediately, followed by the FATA, in three phases. As an example, this could be done by merging the Khyber and Orakzai agencies in Phase One, followed by Bajaur, Mohamand, and Kurram agencies in Phase Two and finally the North and South Waziristan agencies in Phase Three. This manageable approach is based on the existing level of development in the different agencies. The initial two agencies can act as role models for the others and will allow sufficient time to prepare the people of other agencies for the change. A potential problem is that any failure in the first phase will jeopardize the entire process. These changes will be strongly opposed by beneficiaries of the current system, who will lose their status.

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VI. APPLICABILITY OF INFORMATION OPERATION TOOLS TO ACHIEVE FATA INTEGRATION

A. FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information operations (IO) is defined as:

Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion, and decision-making ability, through affecting his information, information-based processes, and systems while protecting one's own decision makers and decision-making processes.⁶⁷

An adversary's effectiveness is a function of his will and capability. IO focuses on influencing will and on affecting those capabilities that directly enable the application of will. IO is targeted at all audiences at any level capable of influencing the situation, whether adversary, friendly or uncommitted. IO aims to influence the adversary's perceptions and will, undermining cohesion and shaping the battle space. For example, by questioning the legitimacy of their leadership and cause, IO may undermine their moral power base, separating leadership from supporters; political, military and public, thus weakening their desire to continue and affecting their actions. IO aims to reinforce and protect the will of friends and allies by strengthening resolve and by countering adversary attempts to influence it, in order to maintain friendly cohesion and reinforce freedom of action. IO also aims to present and promote the alliance case to uncommitted audiences and influence their perceptions in our favor. Ultimately, IO seeks to affect actions; it helps shape the battle space, attacking the adversary's cohesion and protecting our own, while exploiting the situation. It can make use of all military activities to attack or defend will and capability and is integrated with broader military activity as part of the campaign plan. Clearly, attacks on capability also have an effect on will and vice versa; therefore, IO and

⁶⁷ Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts, *Joint Welfare Publication 3-80, Information Operations*, June 2002, http://www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2270/jwp3_80.pdf.

broader military activity must be carefully integrated to ensure that the desired overall impact is achieved. Two main aspects of IO are *influence activity*, which is the primary means of influencing will, and *counter-command activity* (CCA), which attacks capability. However, each may have an impact on the other and they should not be considered exclusive activities. All activities, be they on will or capability, are dependent on the provision of good information, which is supported and protected through information activity.⁶⁸

B. HURDLES IN INTEGRATING IO WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS

Doctrine, intelligence support and resourcing and funding to IO are primary issues to tackle. Most military commanders are not well aware of how to integrate IO into their operations. The military doctrine of various countries does not provide military commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO into their operations. Doctrine presents IO in a disjointed manner and as a function that is essentially separate from the commander's other requirements and missions—not as something that must be integrated into all his requirements and missions. Second, IO requires proper intelligence support to be effective, but intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intelligence support to IO to be effective. Intelligence doctrine provides little practical guidance on support to IO and intelligence professionals are currently unprepared to provide the in-depth analysis of the information environment that IO requires. Third, most militaries have allocated resources to conduct IO in an effective manner. Due to the combined effect of all of this, the information mechanism fails to adequately portray the information environment. Also, it hinders the activities through which commanders can process the reporting that would allow them to analyze and portray the information environment. Professional military education and unit-training programs do not stress IO as an integrated function and do not present commanders with realistic situations in which they may achieve

⁶⁸ Ibid.

success in the information environment. As a result of these three issues, commanders just do not understand how to integrate IO.⁶⁹

C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IO AND IW

Before dwelling further into what information warfare (IW) and IO is, it is appropriate to define what information is:

(D)ata that (1) has been verified to be accurate and timely, (2) is specific and organized for a purpose, (3) is presented within a context that gives it meaning and relevance and (4) that can lead to an increase in understanding and decrease in uncertainty. The value of information lies solely in its ability to affect a behavior, decision or outcome. A piece of information is considered valueless if, after receiving it, things remain unchanged.⁷⁰

IO more specifically is:

(T)he integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer-network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.⁷¹

The information warfare definition is not that precise. It lacks a common vocabulary. It is also referred to as the “fifth dimension of warfare.” Some definitions of IW are so broad that it appears to be covering all human endeavors.⁷² Nevertheless, we can say that IW is the use of information, or information systems, to disrupt or destroy an organization perceived to be an enemy. The overriding objective is to coerce the target to act in a way that is favorable to the attacker’s wishes and overall plan. The use of information to

⁶⁹ Joseph L. Cox, “Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?” (Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College).

⁷⁰ “Information,” <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/information.html>.

⁷¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations*, (February 2006), 1:1.

⁷² Martin Libicki, “What is Information Warfare? (ACIS Paper 3, National Defense University, 1995), 6.

gain advantage over an adversary is not new; however, the magnitude of the impact of these tactics has increased in this information age. Society as a whole is feeling the impact and accompanying massive changes as information increasingly becomes a source of power, influence and economic gain. There are a number of definitions available, which describe the term IO in various manners. There seems to be conflicting views about this term among scholars and warfare experts. One such definition is “the use of information or information technology during a time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.”⁷³

D. OVERALL IO PERSPECTIVE (UNITED STATES)

1. The Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is one in which humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and it is therefore the principal environment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct, it resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.⁷⁴

a. The Physical Dimension

The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2) systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations.⁷⁵

In Pakistan, this dimension has been further augmented and given the name of C⁴I²SR, which stands for command, control, communications,

⁷³ Edward Waltz, *Information Warfare Principles and Operations* (Artech House Publications, 1998), 15-16.

⁷⁴ 3-13 *Information Operations*, 1:2.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

computers, intelligence, IO, surveillance and reconnaissance. Under this umbrella, all related activities are also covered. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups and populations.

Comparatively, the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently combat. Power has traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension.⁷⁶

b. The Informational Dimension

The informational dimension is where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of modern military forces is communicated, and where the commander's intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be protected.⁷⁷

If information is breached in this stage, the overall effectiveness of any impending operation is degraded to a great extent. In Pakistan, this dimension is mostly looked after by the respective services' intelligence setups, under the umbrella of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.

c. The Cognitive Dimension

The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize, and decide.⁷⁸

The Strategic-Planning Division (SPD) in Pakistan, in collaboration with the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) directorate, takes care of this dimension.

Factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension”⁷⁹.

Therefore, operations like PSYOP have a major role to play here.

2. Principles of Information Operations and Core IO Capabilities

Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential information while denying it to the adversary and other target audiences.⁸⁰

Basically, this constitutes the most essential and critical element of any campaign. Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries, now they have been joined by EW and CNO. The following outlines of IO capabilities have been taken directly from the referenced documents and are provided as background.

a. Psychological Operations

PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP are to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP personnel advise the commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of every aspect of force employment and how to develop a strategy for developing and planning the dissemination of specific PSYOP programs. During a crisis, a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) is deployed. A POAT is a small, tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution and

⁷⁹ 3-13 Information Operations.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

dissemination and logistics specialists. The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP objectives and recommends the appropriate level of support to accomplish the mission.⁸¹

b. PSYOP as an IO Core Capability

In today's information environment, even PSYOP conducted at the tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must be understood, and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the early stages of an operation, given the time it takes to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. PSYOP must be coordinated with counterintelligence (CI), MILDEC and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and control. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA staff in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of the core, supporting and related capabilities of IO, particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO and EW.⁸²

c. Military Deception

MILDEC is described as those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces' mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities; MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny real information to an adversary and prevent the correct deduction of friendly plans. All information operations capabilities have competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the

⁸¹ 3-13 *Information Operations*, 2:1.

⁸² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, (September 2003).

resources required for the real operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan.⁸³

d. MILDEC as an IO Core Capability

MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. It exploits the adversary's information systems, processes and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon understanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan and how they use information management to support their efforts. Each of the core, supporting and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of successful MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time.⁸⁴

e. Operations Security

OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to identify what friendly information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions and cause adversary decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information.⁸⁵

f. OPSEC as an IO Core Capability

OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach. To be effective, other types of security measures

⁸³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13.4 Military Deception*, (January 2012).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ 3-13 *Information Operations*, 4:3.

like physical security, information assurance (IA) programs, computer network defense (CND), etc., must complement OPSEC.⁸⁶

g. Electronic Warfare

EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) and directed energy to control the EM spectrum. EW includes three major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP) and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involves the use of EM energy, directed energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability. EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conducting of future operations.⁸⁷

h. EW as an IO Core Capability

EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensive and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt and exploit adversarial use of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility and threat of EW. All of the core, supporting and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit from EW.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13.3 Operations Security*, (June 2006).

⁸⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare*, (January 2007).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

i. Computer Network Operations

CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations. In recent publications and doctrinal changes this is being increasingly referred to as “Cyber”. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting information technology (IT) infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade and disrupt core, supporting and related IO capabilities and to deny, exploit and defend electronic information and infrastructure.⁸⁹

j. CNO as an IO Core Capability

The increasing reliance of sophisticated militaries and terrorist groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2 forces reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of computers and the range of their employment broaden, new vulnerabilities and opportunities continue to develop. This offers opportunities to attack and exploit an adversary's computer system weaknesses.⁹⁰

3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities

Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI and COMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities.⁹¹

a. Information Assurance

IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of

⁸⁹ 3-13 *Information Operations*, 4:1.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

information systems by incorporating protection, detection and reaction capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority.⁹²

b. IA as a Supporting Capability for IO

IO depends on IA to protect information and information systems. IA and IO have an operational relationship in which IO is concerned with the coordination of military activities in the information environment, while IA protects the electronic and automated portions of the information environment. IA and all aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other to be effective.⁹³

c. Physical Security

Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft. The physical security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats and applying appropriate deterrent, control and denial techniques responding to changing conditions.⁹⁴

d. Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO

Just as IA protects friendly electronic information and information systems, physical security protects physical facilities containing information and information systems. Physical security often contributes to OPSEC, particularly in the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity could compromise the real plan.⁹⁵

⁹² Department of Defense, *Directive 8500.1 Information Assurance (IA), Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance (IA)*, (October 2002).

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-07.2 Antiterrorism*, (November 2010), *JP 3-57 Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, (July 2008) and *JP 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater*, (February 2010).

⁹⁵ Ibid.

e. Physical Attack

The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical attack disrupts, damages or destroys adversary targets through destructive power. Physical attack can also be used to create or alter adversary perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information systems.⁹⁶

f. Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO

Physical attack can be employed in support of IO as a means of attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy's ability to exercise C2. IO capabilities, like PSYOP for example, can be employed in support of a physical attack to maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary.⁹⁷

g. Counterintelligence

CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities or sabotage conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof.⁹⁸

h. CI as a Supporting Capability for IO

CI procedures are a critical part of guarding friendly information and information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA, physical security, CI and OPSEC with risk-management procedures offers the best chance to protect friendly information and information systems from adversary actions.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ 3-13 *Information Operations*.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 2-01.2 Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Operations*.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

i. Combat Camera

The COMCAM mission is to provide the combatant commands and other higher-ups with an imagery capability in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations.¹⁰⁰

j. Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO

COMCAM supports all of the capabilities of IO that use images of friendly force operations to influence an adversary or support its own forces or allies. They provide images for PSYOP, MILDEC, PA, and Civil-Military Operations (CMO) use, but can also be used for BDA or measures of effectiveness (MOE) analysis. COMCAM can also provide records of IO actions for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.¹⁰¹

k. Information Operations Related Capabilities

These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, the primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conducting of IO.¹⁰²

l. Public Affairs

PA is public information, command information and community relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences. PA is

¹⁰⁰ 3-13 *Information Operations*.

¹⁰¹ Field Manual [FM] 3-55.12; Marine Corps Reference Publication [MCRP] 3-33.7A; Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [NTTP] 3-13.12; Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Instruction) [AFTTP [1]] 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations.

¹⁰² 3-13 *Information Operations*.

essential for joint forces information superiority and credible PA operations are necessary to support the commander's mission and to maintain essential public liaisons.¹⁰³

m. Civil-Military Operations¹⁰⁴

CMOs are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace. They are conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster or may be conducted independent of other military operations. CMOs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional or national government.¹⁰⁵

n. CMO as a Related Capability to IO

CMOs can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre or post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained. Early consideration of the civil–military environment in which operations will take place is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the development of broader IO plans and objectives. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA and PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-61 Public Affairs*, (August 2010).

¹⁰⁴ 3-57 *Civil-Military Operations*.

¹⁰⁵ 3-61 *Public Affairs*.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

o. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by military and state components, in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the government.¹⁰⁷

4. How IO Targets an Adversary

IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systems with specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted with increasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in order to affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation.¹⁰⁸

5. How IO Can Affect Data

IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways:

- By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add, modify, or remove information from the environment of decision makers.
- By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes, and/or stores information in support of decision makers.
- By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data, information, and knowledge.¹⁰⁹

6. Various Effects which Can Be Achieved through IO

All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations. Commanders use IO capabilities simultaneously to accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations and systems. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following:

¹⁰⁷ Department of Defense, *Directive 8500.1 Information Assurance (IA)*, (October 2002).

¹⁰⁸ 3-13 *Information Operations*.

¹⁰⁹ Jarol B. Manheim, *Strategy in Information and Influence Campaigns* (Taylor & Francis, 2011).

- **Destroy:** To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
- **Disrupt:** To break or interrupt the flow of information.
- **Degrade:** To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or communication systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale of a unit.
- **Deny:** To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information, systems, and services.
- **Deceive:** To cause a person to believe what is not true.
- **Exploit:** To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information
- **Influence:** To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to own forces.
- **Protect:** To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information.
- **Detect:** To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems.
- **Restore:** To bring information and systems back to their original state.
- **Respond:** To react quickly to an adversary's or others' IO attack or intrusion.¹¹⁰

E. EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICABILITY OF IO IN DEFUSING THE FATA SITUATION

1. Psychological Operations

Although PSYOP are planned to convey selected information to target audiences, the applicability of PSYOP cannot be ruled out for conveying selected truth to the people of the FATA. Though this capability has not been used against the domestic or local population, considering the special circumstances prevailing in the FATA, it could be appropriate to do so. The people of the FATA have few economic opportunities compared to others living in other parts of Pakistan. Since no mega projects have been initiated in the area in an effort to

¹¹⁰ 3-13 Information Operations.

uplift the local population, economic indicators are far below the required index. Inhabitants of this region are not conversant with terms like industry, business and public-related services. The only way that the FATA can escape this economic muddle is to start mega projects in these areas. Maliks and local *sardars*, or tribal elders, are resisting government efforts, since they do not want people to prosper and stand on their own feet. They consider this scenario a grave challenge to their hegemony in the area. PSYOP presents opportunities to counter their resistance and if necessary, negate their influence.

A strong theme that will “sell like hot cakes” in the FATA is that the natural resources of the FATA have been exploited by the local politicians and tribal elders, who have mostly used these for their personal gains and to pile up their own personal wealth. Tribal heads have not used money to construct schools and universities in the area. They have not initiated any welfare task for the local populace, such as hospitals and other useful institutions in the social sector.

It is very important to understand that a “one solution fits all” approach will not work in the FATA since the dynamics in the area are different from one agency to another. A thorough analysis is required to develop themes for individual tribes or group of tribes who have common traditions and cultural values or links. All available means, such as print media, the internet, electronic media and local influential elders, should be included in the overall scheme to address the problem squarely, keeping in view the intellectual and social setup of the target audiences. If the above-mentioned means are used in a traditional manner, they may not be able to accrue the desired effects and prove counterproductive. In a tribal society, local religious heads are considered to be more trustworthy than any form of electronic or print media. It will be very useful if PSYOPs are launched to change the mindset of these religious heads; that, in turn, can increase the message's impact. This would further influence the local population, regardless of the message content, a practice known as using a credible communicator or source. If used with care and ingenuity, this core capability has immense chances to succeed in the FATA environment.

2. Military Deception

Military Deception consists of actions that are performed to intentionally mislead the opponent decision maker in order to facilitate the mission accomplishment of friendly forces. Anyone who makes a decision that affects the military could be a deception target; the individual may not necessarily be a person in uniform. In Pakistan, the president, though is a civilian, can be a lucrative target, since he makes decisions that affect the military. In FATA, there is a need to focus on the terrorist or miscreant decision makers. Efforts should be made to try to influence him to take actions that are counterproductive to his force objectives and suit our design. The intent and means of deception should be guarded ruthlessly. Efforts should be made so that information reaches our intended deception target well in time and the deception theme should be well knitted into the overall operational plan of the forces conducting security operations in the region. Theater-level deceptions, if planned, are to be dovetailed with tactical deceptions to achieve synergy in effort. Good intelligence is the heart of deception. Security apparatus in the FATA can collect intelligence about the intentions and perceptions of miscreants and can then initiate actions that reinforce terrorist perceptions. However, the actual operation must be planned counter to the perceptions of miscreants and terrorists. Monitoring indicators are important throughout the deception to ascertain whether terrorists are becoming prey to our enticement or not. Good operational security pays rich dividends. We must eliminate indicators that can give away deception themes, lest terrorists not take the bait.

Groups of fighters supporting pro-security forces, or peace battlers, are groups of individuals in the area who claim to be peace loving and fight miscreants and terrorists along with security forces troops. Security forces in the area can make a display of them to protect their camp or village in order to deter an attack from miscreants. This can be spread in the area so that all pro-security forces groups, camps and villages are protected by the regular fighting troops of the security forces. This will not be true and may work for a limited period of time,

but with efficient OPSEC management, this theme can work for a considerable period of time. It not only raises the morale of the peace battlers, in that security forces are with them, but it also deters miscreants from launching an attack on security forces sympathizers. Most miscreants and terrorists believe that security forces in the region are overstretched, due to the vastness of the area. In addition, troops who are assigned to hold a post or locality are understrength and therefore lack enough force to defend the post or locality at night. This terrorist perception can be reinforced by manning a post or locality with minimum strength, but keeping a strong, quick-reaction force nearby to cause maximum damage to miscreants if they decide to attack the post.

3. Operations Security

The success of any operation largely depends upon how a force can hide its signature from the enemy. If the details of the operation can be hidden from the adversary's decision makers, then the chance of success multiplies. Operations security needs to be maintained at all times. Since it is not possible to hide each and every possible detail, it is important that at least all critical information be identified and hidden from the adversary. Security forces in the FATA can hide their critical information to include force structure and intentions. This supports deception, as discussed in the previous section. Security forces can mislead the adversary to pick some part of the information that is not relevant or critical and subsequently base their response on a misjudged piece of information. Information can be intentionally fed to the miscreants in such a manner that they feel that they have some trusted and authenticated piece of information contrary to information that could be of any use to them.

4. Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare can be very useful if planned and deployed judiciously so as to achieve desired results with minimum collateral damage and fratricide. The use of wireless and satellite telephones in the FATA by miscreants has become very common. They have also started to use local radio stations to

broadcast their messages to the local population. These messages are mostly threatening and sometimes used to discredit the security forces present in the region. A new blending of messages has come to the limelight, in which terrorists and miscreants in a region have started to announce punishments to all individuals alleged to be helping security forces.

Due to the increased importance of the electromagnetic spectrum to enemy and friendly forces, EW has gained considerable significance in the region. EW capabilities can be used to monitor, locate, and exploit the wireless traffic of the miscreants while protecting friendly communication. All three elements of EW, i.e., electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support, should be used in unison to supplement and support each other and with the resolve to degrade, neutralize or destroy the miscreant's combat capability. Friendly use of the EM spectrum in a region must be assured at all times, in support of military operations and objectives. All efforts should be made to locate and identify sources of broadcast that harass and influence locals and compel them to fight against security forces. There is a compelling need to use ES capabilities to intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of enemy transmissions that threaten military and governmental objectives in the region.

5. Computer Network Operations

A thorough analysis of computer network operations capabilities of miscreants in the FATA reveals that they do not have any sophisticated computer-based or network infrastructure. Therefore, there is little need or opportunity to utilize CNO in the FATA at present. However, our own computer and network-based infrastructure needs to be protected at all times. Terrorists and miscreants are making use of the Internet through satellite and other cell phones, though on a very small scale; these can be tracked easily through network-monitoring tools and protocol analyzers. Through hacking techniques, they can be exploited to access the cell phones of miscreants in order to delete their cell messages and disrupt the flow of information, paralyzing their

communication and decision making ability. A data pattern can be obtained to analyze what sites these miscreants have been visiting frequently. Statistics can also be obtained for a useful analysis at a later stage. Miscreant connections to the outside world are a big concern and can be traced with sophisticated mathematical models, such as dark networks. These tools can further help in unearthing organizational hierarchies and behaviors of terrorist networks. This data can be shared globally to bust exposé organizations, which are helping and assisting these elements from the outside world.

F. INFORMATION-OPERATIONS SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES

“The supporting IO capabilities are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO campaign.”¹¹¹ If not all, then most of the supporting IO capabilities are very much pertinent to the FATA. There would be a need to integrate and coordinate these supporting capabilities with core capabilities and conventional military activities. Sometimes they appear to be overlapping with core capabilities, so their integration and coordination is a must for a successful IO campaign in support of military operations.

1. Information Assurance

In order to succeed in the FATA it is must that all parameters of information assurance are strictly adhered to. All efforts must be made to protect our information system by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Protecting our information systems against a possible terrorist threat will pay rich dividends in any future operation in the FATA. Miscreants do not currently have the ability to launch an attack against friendly information systems; however they are quite capable of hiring the expertise of some international or homegrown terrorists and causing severe damage to information systems of security forces deployed in the FATA.

¹¹¹ 3-13 *Information Operations*.

2. Physical Security

This has two dimensions. The first is the physical measures for the safety of personnel to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage and theft. The second is related to physical aspects of security. The prevailing environment in the FATA dictates that the second aspect has more weight. One big impediment that security forces are confronted with is the identification between friend and foe. If an innocent individual is mistaken for a terrorist and killed, the consequences are grave. Security forces lose the support of the locals; whereas, on the other hand, if some miscreants are able to get inside the camp or military installation and successfully blow themselves up, it demoralizes the troops and creates frustration among the ranks for not being able to identify the enemy.

3. Physical Attack

The kinetic approach is an extreme course of action. At times it becomes necessary if all other options have been tried and failed. Military operations in the FATA are ongoing because terrorists have refused to lay down their arms and are unwilling to accept any solution that nullifies their unlawful hegemony in the region. The Pakistani army faces a unique situation that is complex and has varied dimensions. It has to fight and launch operations against its own people, a very sensitive issue. Any stern action raises clamor from all corners of the country, terming it unjustified, mostly from religious parties and opposition parties, for minor political gains. Therefore, it is important to try all other means available before launching any offensive military operation. Some religious parties are even skeptical of the army's presence in the FATA and demand quick, unconditional withdrawal.

If physical attack becomes an absolute necessity, use of minimum force at selected locations where terrorist and miscreant hideouts exist should be planned to flush out the criminals and give peace a fair chance to succeed.

Foreign elements are playing an active role to further deteriorate conditions in the FATA. Most of the opposition in the FATA receives sophisticated arms from these foreign elements, which they use to challenge security forces deployed in the region. If these miscreants and terrorists are not defeated militarily, a majority of the local population will lose confidence in the ability of the armed forces to combat terrorism in the region. Apprehension will grow that the entire society may surrender to these miscreants. If the writ of the government and rule of law is not established in these areas, it will give the impression to miscreants that government is not capable of handling the situation and the silent majority in these areas, who are mostly peace loving, will become hostage to the miscreants. Therefore, carefully planned military operations should be conducted, but with sufficient coordination with PSYOP and other information-related capabilities to keep people abreast of the reasons for launching such operations. The population needs to be made aware that the likely fruits of such operations can shape the FATA to become a place free from terrorists and miscreants, able to move forward towards greater prosperity.

4. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence overlaps with operation security in its design and parameters. It also guards friendly information and information systems. A detailed security plan needs to be developed for the IO plan to succeed. Security planning should take into considerations IA, physical security, CI and OPSEC. A well-orchestrated IO plan will help in attaining objectives in these tribal areas.

5. Combat Camera

Combat camera has immense potential to support the success of military operations in the FATA. Most of the FATA areas are comprised of lofty mountains, thick forests and ravines, where conventional surveillance equipment is not very effective. Most of the radars deployed in the area work on the line-of-sight principal and thus cannot provide coverage over the entire area. Most of the time, miscreants incorrectly claim they have inflicted heavy losses to law

enforcing agencies and falsely claim victory in combat actions. COMCAM can assist in ascertaining the extent of damage and thus effectively counter miscreant propaganda. COMCAM can help to portray the truth about messages and military operations in the FATA, versus the deliberate lies and propaganda spread and portrayed by the miscreants.

G. INFORMATION OPERATIONS RELATED CAPABILITIES

There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil–military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO.¹¹²

For this reason, PA and CMO staffs in particular must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff for the entire campaign in the FATA.

1. Public Affairs

PA has two dimensions. First, it has to provide fact-based, true information to the public audience and friendly forces to counter miscreant rumors and baseless propaganda. A second aspect is to support OPSEC by taking the media into our confidence. Often, the media inadvertently releases critical information that jeopardizes the whole operation. In Pakistan, a number of channels have been granted a license to work; therefore, there are chances that, in an effort to break news before others, media reporters can accidentally report information that can jeopardize the success of the whole mission. This can put the life of soldiers in the FATA at greater risk. The media must be taken into confidence and told to report with responsibility without giving away operational details of any military or nonmilitary operation.

¹¹² 3-13 *Information Operations*.

It is important that the people of the FATA are told the underlying reasons for launching military operations. Most of the people in the FATA have been led to believe that the Pakistani army is in the area to assist or help other international players in the region who are intent on destroying Islam. Locals fall prey to this theme and join hands with adversaries in attacking security forces to protect Islam. If the PA can show that Pakistani forces are fighting inside Pakistani territory and fighting against those who are killing their own brethren, things can change dramatically. People must be made to understand the truth of the situation. They can be convinced by initiating themes, which will focus on peace as the only outcome and objective of the security forces in this region and that social justice and economic progress will come in its wake.

2. Civil-Military Operations

CMO can play a decisive role in solving problems within the FATA. CMO is part of a three-pronged strategy that can provide a sustainable solution to the FATA issue. A deterrence, dialog and development strategy is the way forward in the FATA. While *deterrence* in this discussion mainly deals with a conventional military solution, *dialog and development* have direct relationships with CMO. Those factions of miscreants who are willing to lay down arms but hesitate to approach local military commanders for various reasons can consult their local tribal elders, who in turn can initiate dialog with military commanders on the ground. Development strategies cannot make any progress until and unless CMO is effectively utilized. During peacetime, when no operations are in progress, CMO can help in building bonds of confidence and trust between security forces and the local population. Reaching out to locals is a strategy that helps with “winning the hearts and minds of people.”

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VII. MEASURES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PREAMBLE

After analysis of the overall political, administrative, socioeconomic and security environments, it can be concluded that there is a need to undertake effective measures to address the issues of concern and initiate a process for integration of the FATA into the national mainstream of Pakistan. The recommendations have been divided into two major segments, short-term recommendations oriented towards reforms that affect a particular system and long-term recommendations for an overall integration plan. Because of the nature of problem, the distinction between the two may be somewhat blurred.

B. SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Administrative, Judicial and Political Systems

The authority of the auditor general should be extended to the FATA for a proper audit of all accounts. The authority of the political agent or jirga to award any unchallengeable punishment should be revoked. The jirga should be made free from the influence of the political agent. The jurisdiction of the high court and supreme court should be extended into tribal areas as well. A gradual and phased amendment in the FCR, a remainder of the British era, and the jirga system should be carried out initially. Later, the FCR should be replaced with the Pakistani penal code as part of the long-term plan. Administrative and judicial functions should be separated by appointing magistrates in the FATA.

2. Socioeconomic Conditions

The socioeconomic development strategy forms the focal point as it envisages integration of tribal areas through development. Extremely low literacy rates necessitate extensive improvement in the education sector and the establishment of schools, colleges and technical training centers. A rigorous development plan should be chalked out to initiate development activities in all

socioeconomic sectors, including infrastructure. Emphasis should be given to the communications and health sectors, poverty reduction and participatory development in all socioeconomic fields.

a. *Improvement of Road Communication*

Road communication forms the backbone for any industrial or economic activity. A network of roads needs to be developed to include arterial roads, link roads, farm-to-market roads that connect villages, linkage with adjoining areas of the Punjab, Balochistan and NWFP (renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and development of roads for cross-border trade with Afghanistan.

b. *Extension of Railway Links*

Rail communication is the cheapest mode of transportation, but is comparatively expensive to develop. A railway link is available from Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, which are mainland and settled areas. If the railway is extended to the tribal areas: Wana, Thall and Miranshah, it would create a revolutionary change in the outlook of the tribal areas, as it would connect the belt with the main country, reducing its isolation.

c. *Establishment of an Airport*

In view of the large distances involved, smaller airports for supporting operation of light aircraft may be considered at the tribal belt areas of Razmak/Wana and Kurram.

d. *Energy Needs*

To develop the cottage industries of the area, electric power should be available in most parts of the FATA. Moreover, natural gas should be provided for cottage industries and as a replacement for wood fuel, to conserve forests.

e. *Revenue Records and Land Settlement*

Revenue and land records should be prepared in the same manner as in the rest of Pakistan, as communal land ownership in tribal areas is a major impediment to economic growth. An ownership system should be evolved through a modern land-settlement system to promote economic progress. This way, apart from agricultural development, individual ownership of land would enable the people of the FATA to seek loans for businesses by mortgaging their land. Settlement of land on an individual-ownership basis would also help in improving the socioeconomic infrastructure, which is otherwise compromised due to political and tribal disputes in the FATA.

f. *A Participatory Role in Development*

It is highly important that the average citizen in the tribal areas be provided a participatory role in the development and welfare of the area. Previously, only maliks have benefitted from the existing development process; the common person has always been ignored.

g. *Health*

People of the FATA are mainly dependent on hospital care in settled areas as basic health units (BHU) and hospitals are mostly undermanned and underequipped. These aspects need immediate attention.

h. *Revitalization of Existing Development Schemes*

A very sore and unfortunate aspect of existing development schemes, e.g., schools, BHUs and water supply, in the FATA is that they are left incomplete or, on completion, remain inactive. The developed assets decay without accruing any benefit to the community. A vigorous drive to reactivate all such schemes should be launched and strict measures should be adopted to avoid this in the future.

i. Human Resource Development

An extremely low literacy rate necessitates extensive improvement in the educational sector. Education and human resource development should be used as a powerful instrument of socioeconomic and political change. Special measures should be initiated to impart technical education to the people of the area and increase employment opportunities. The number of degree colleges should be increased, including separate colleges for males and females. Community schools should be opened up near all major villages to impart primary and secondary education to the children. Existing madrassahs should be incorporated in the overall education strategy after a revision of their syllabus.

A FATA education department that can take possession of the schools was recently opened by the Pakistani army and needs to develop the necessary teaching staff as early as possible. Compulsory education for all children between the ages of 5 to 14 years of age must be provided. The members of union councils should form part of an education committee and should ensure that no child remains deprived of education. These committees, composed of local people aware of the financial positions of the parents, should arrange for help from the *zakat*, or charity, fund for needy students where required. The institution of the mosques can also be effectively used for promotion of literacy and education.

The media play a vital role in supporting the spread of education. The potentials of print and electronic media should be fully utilized to motivate the public to support literacy programs. The government should make an effort to provide textbooks, stationery and lunch to the students. All this will only be possible if the education budget is increased substantially.

j. Allocation of Funds

The FATA should be included in National Finance Commission (NFC) awards as a separate entity, on the basis of its population and area, until

the time as it is merged with NWFP. The central government should provide loans to tribesmen to explore their own sources of sustenance.¹¹³

k. Trade Sector

The international efforts for reconstruction in Afghanistan and opening up of trade routes to the Central Asian republics offer great economic opportunities for Pakistan and the FATA.¹¹⁴ For this purpose, the opening of additional trade routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be prioritized. Custom regulations should be relaxed to encourage legalization of smuggling or informal trade.

l. Agriculture Sector

The FATA has great potential in the fields of fruit farming, livestock and forestry. The grant of attainable loans to farmers, improvement in irrigation networks, settlement of land and revenue records, establishment of new veterinary hospitals, provision of food processing facilities, launching of an effective forest conservation campaign, establishment of checks against smuggling and modernization of the timber industry will pay rich dividends.

m. Minerals Sector

Due to the wide variety of minerals present, the government should involve tribesmen in joint ventures for mineral exploration while bringing the whole of the FATA under geological survey mapping.

n. Industrial Sector

The government should provide adequate incentives to the private sector for industrial development of construction materials, including cement,

¹¹³ Tariq Iqbal Burki, interview by author by email, Quetta, May 17, 2005.

¹¹⁴ Iftikhar Hussain Shah, "Pakistan enjoys warm relations with ASEAN countries, says Iftikhar," *The News*, April 30, 2004.

wood and marble products. The existing manufacturing facilities for small arms and ammunition should be modernized.

o. Tourism Sector

There is still a great amount of romance and attraction attached to the tribal areas, owing to their peculiar history and status. Promotion of tourism to exploit this mystique can help promote integration as well as produce a local economic uplift.

3. The Security Situation

Creation of a security environment conducive to economic activity is essential. The frontier constabulary and khasadar forces should be organized to operate as police in the area. In this multi-pronged strategy, the focal point of the army's role should be to maintain a concentrated presence in the area and keep a low profile in day-to-day affairs.

The following points are recommended to improve the overall security situation in the area and deal with ongoing problems:

- Co-opting of the major political parties in a dialogue to build up a credible popular base in the larger national interest. Religious political parties with influence in the area should be used to allay misperceptions about military operations after necessary negotiations.
- Permanent establishment of an effective intelligence setup.
- Permanent stationing of the army in small cantonments across the FATA.
- Integration of the local population in law enforcement agencies.
- Execution of an effective campaign to win the hearts and minds of the people through meaningful reforms of the administrative system, coupled with extensive development works.
- Direct interaction with the local population, bypassing the maliks.
- Launch of an effective media campaign, to include publishing a white paper on the conduct of operations to neutralize the impact of hostile media.

- Special training and equipping of army units and law enforcement agencies operating in the area.
- Sealing of the borders and restriction of movement within them.
- Repatriation of Afghan refugees present in the area at the earliest opportunity.

4. Applicability of IO Tools

Information operations can play a significant role in FATA integration. Various themes can play a decisive role in transforming people's opinion. People should be encouraged to support the establishment of a judicial system on similar lines as in the rest of the country. If the jurisdiction of the appellate courts on the provincial and federal levels is extended to the FATA, it will result in real and substantive changes in the tribal areas. IO tools, if applied with ingenuity, can enhance public awareness that socioeconomic progress in their area can change their lives and the lives of future generations. Illiteracy has exposed innocent children to miscreants' deceitful propaganda about the values of Islam. IO tools can help the FATA's inhabitants realize the fruits of constructing schools and universities in that region. On one hand, the application of IO tools can restore the confidence of security forces in their capacity to control miscreants in the area, while on the other hand, it will reestablish the mutual confidence between locals and security forces. Schools, universities and other related social service institutions will attract youth of the FATA and they will no longer be available as recruits to miscreants for fulfillment of their evil designs.

IO can transform the Pakistani army's strategic thinking. It can help in its transition from a fighting force, inherently designed to fight conventional threat, to a potent, lean and agile outfit that can undertake multifaceted operations in the FATA region. IO tools can help Pakistan develop an effective COIN strategy to defeat terrorism and militancy in the FATA. This also demands that the United States must keep working hand in glove with Pakistan to achieve common goals and objectives in that region. The U.S. has rendered adequate assistance to conduct IO in the FATA, yet increased combat camera support, EW and PA

assistance must be ensured and continued. Countering remote controlled IEDs, EW devices, and enhancing Pakistani security forces' C4/ISR capabilities will have a direct impact on IO. The United States should also provide substantial help to Pakistan in the FATA to counter negative messages and to plan and conduct meaningful PSYOP.

C. LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Elections and Representation at the Grassroots Level

Elections for various tiers of local government should be held in a phased manner. In Phase 1, elections of union councils, elections at the grassroots level, should be held as early as possible. The functions should be as elsewhere in the country. These councils must have financial powers to ensure that requisite funds are available within each representative body and that development work progresses visibly and simultaneously, with maximum speed and supervision. Seats for women, if not filled by elections, should be filled by nomination. These bodies will replace the old system, which only benefitted tribal elders, with a new system that distributes basic amenities to the people.

2. Merger of Frontier Regions and PATAs

On successful conclusion of grassroots level elections, the frontier regions and the provincially administered tribal areas (PATAs) should be merged with the NWFP. The population of these regions should continue to be exempted from the customs act and other benefits presently being enjoyed by them should continue while the remaining areas of the FATA are yet to be integrated.

3. Merger of the FATA

A phased strategy is suggested for implementation. Through a constitutional package, the FATA should be given representation in the NWFP, renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, assembly and elections for provincial assemblies should be held in all agencies without changing the status of the FATA. The advantages would be that elected members would be able to carry

out the political groundwork for integration of the FATA into the national mainstream. The chief minister would be involved in administration of the FATA, as the administrative machinery comes from the FATA and he would exert control over them through the chief secretary. This will do away with the artificially created compartments of the governor and chief minister.

During the interim period, the FATA secretariat should continue to hold control over FATA areas and remain with the governor. Frontier crimes regulations should continue to remain applicable. The number of seats in the NWFP assembly should be determined by population in each agency and representation in the national assembly.

The period for implementation should remain flexible. Based on ground realities, the complete merger of the FATA should be carried out within the next three years. Responsibility for administration should be transferred from the FATA secretariat to the chief minister of NWFP. All seven agencies should be formed into districts and absorbed into the political machinery of the NWFP government. Subdivisions of all agencies should be converted into *tehsils*. The writ of the government should be extended to the entire FATA, not just along roads and tracks. The Political Parties Act should be extended into the FATA. This way, the political parties would have a stake in integration of the FATA into the national mainstream.

4. Economic Incentives

To reduce opposition to integration, a number of incentives should be provided to the population, e.g., an exemption from state duties or taxes for a period of five years; additional employment opportunities in government departments; army and CAF registration of all cars and vehicles operating in tribal areas, without any duties as a onetime measure; and additional seats in professional colleges and stipends to children. Finally, execution of a massive development package must be achieved, with consultation from professionals in the field and supervision by the army.

5. Amendments to the Constitution

Relevant acts of the constitution must be amended accordingly. All laws of the state should be made applicable to the FATA and the legislative authority of the Parliament in regards to the FATA must be applied. Initially, the FCR must be amended to eliminate inhumane clauses and subsequently eliminated altogether, while making all laws of the state applicable to the FATA.

D. CONCLUSION

It is said that the only thing permanent in this world is change. At times, change might reflect a compulsion to break the barriers formed by inherent stagnation spread over all those long years. Various governments in the last 58 years have kept their eyes closed intentionally and thus, connived in the creation of the present state of affairs in regards to the FATA. We always forget that change is a self-propagating phenomenon that will actuate automatically. If we do not foment positive change, then negative change will foment of its own and the situation may actually go from bad to worse in another ten years' time. A heavy burden lies on those of us who are at the helm of affairs and can realize good changes. The problem now is how quickly we can bring the benefits of modern development and raise the living standards of a people who have been neglected for centuries by foreign domination and alienation. The philosophy of administration in the tribal areas should be to convince our brothers that Pakistan is their country and as such, they have to be given a sense of participation and be assured that the government has given top priority to their welfare through integration into the national mainstream.

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways;
the point, however, is to change it.¹¹⁵

—Karl Marx

¹¹⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (Internaltional Publishers, 1989), 5:8.

APPENDIX A. MAP OF FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS




Table 1. Map derived from Map of NWFP, 1/1 M Scale, 10th Edition 1995, Published by Survey of Pakistan. Tribal agencies in NWFP

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APPENDIX B. COMPOSITION OF TRIBAL AREAS (PER ARTICLE 246 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION)

Tribal Areas as defined in Article 246 of the constitution are:

- Federally Administered Tribal Areas
- Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

Name of Agency/FR	Area (in square miles)	Population according to March 1981 Census (in thousands)	Main Tribes
Bajaur Agency	498	289	Ultman Khel, Salarzai, Charmungi
Mohmand Agency	887	164	Tarakzai, Halimzai, Khwaezai, Baeza
			Safi, Mullagori, Utman Khel
Khyber Agency	995	284	Afridi, Shinwari, Mullagori
Orakzai Agency	403	359	Orakzai
Kurram Agency	1305	294	Turi, Bangash, Ziamusht, Mengal
N.W. Agency	1817	239	Utmanzai Wazir, Daur, Saidgi, Gurba
S.W. Agency	2556	310	Mahsud, Ahmadzai Wazir
F.R. Peshawar	101	37	Hassan Khel
F.R. Kohat	363	57	Jawaki, Adam Khel
F.R. Bannu	339	79	Jani Khel, Bakka
F.R.D.I. Khan	1247	86	Bhittani, Sherani
Total	10511	2198	

Table 2. Composition of Tribal Areas

Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, North West Frontier Province

A. Malakand Division

- Chitral District
- Dir District
- Swat District (which includes Kalam)
- Malakand Protected Areas

B. Peshawar Division (Tribal Areas adjoining Hazara District and the former State of Amb)

Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan Province

A. Quetta Division

- Zhob District
- Loralai District (excluding Duki Tehsil)
- Dalbandin Tehsil of Chagai District

B. Sibi Division Marri-Bugti Tribal Agency

EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX B.




Figure 4. Comparison of Area of Agencies and Frontier Regions

EXHIBIT 2 TO APPENDIX B.




Figure 5. Comparison of Population of Agencies and Frontier Regions

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APPENDIX C. AREA AND POPULATION OF THE FATA

Item	Year	Units	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
Area	-	sq. km	796095	74521	27220	3.4
Population						
Total	1998 Census	Persons	130580	17738	3176	2.4
Male	-do-	-do-	67840	9086	1652	2.4
Female	-do-	-do-	62740	8652	1524	2.4
Urban	-do-	-do-	42459	2994	85	0.2
Rural	-do-	-do-	88121	14744	3091	3.5
Density	-do-	persons per sq. km	164	238	117	-
Annual Growth Rate	1981-98	percentage	2.61	2.82	2.19	-

Table 3. Area and Population of the Fata, Population Census Organization Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP

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APPENDIX D. THE TRIBAL HONOUR CODE – PUKHTUNWALI

To my mind, death is better than life when life can no longer be
held with honor.

—Khushal Khan Khattak

The people of the tribal area, essentially Pathans, are grouped into tight tribal communities: the chief being Bajauris, Mohmands, Afridis, Turis, Wazirs, Mahsuds and Sherains, each with its own distinct individuality, marked off from the other by slight differences ranging from social customs to pronunciation, but all knit together by a common language, culture and religion.

A unique feature of tribal life is the *jirga*, a “moot” or council of tribal elders, which settles all intertribal disputes and acts as the spokesman for the whole tribe where relations with the government are concerned. In many respects, the tribal system of administration is reminiscent of the primary democracy of the city-states of ancient Greece, for it ensures effective participation for every male adult. Although the women have direct participation denied to them, in actual fact, they exercise a very real influence over their menfolk.

Brave to the point of being reckless, impulsive and warmhearted, the tribesmen are ruthless enemies should one violate their code of honor. It is the code of honor and its sanctity and inviolability that the tribesmen cherish above all things. The tribesmen can be bitterest foes; they can also be the staunchest of friends. They are the soul of loyalty. Honor and chivalry dominate; no crime appears more heinous to them than letting down one’s friend.

The Pathan outlook on life has undergone a significant change during the last half century. The Pathans are now awake. They have a genuine desire to change their socioeconomic conditions, without of course disturbing the basic character of tribal society and violating the *pakhtunwali* or Pathan code of honor. They want to make material progress through development of barren and bleak chunks of land by bringing them under the plow, using modern and mechanized

means of farming, by setting up new industries and above all, by fully participating in national and international affairs.

Tribal customs and traditions form an inseparable part of Pashtun society. These are close to the heart of every Pathan and are followed religiously in tribal polity in spite of noticeable social change. Despite these changes, their centuries old traditions, social usage and customs have not changed in the slightest; rather, they have added luster to their way of life. These important traditions, writes James W. Spain¹¹⁶, guide community life and in many cases, influence and even determine the actions of individuals.

Certain traditions of Pathans are almost universal and their knowledge is essential to understanding what the Pathan is and how he got that way. Pashtun social behavior revolves around *pukhtunwali*, sometimes called *Nang-i-Pukhtun*, the Pukhtun code or the Way of the Pathan. Every Pathan is aware of the main elements of *pukhtunwali*. This code has numerous laws, which in one way or the other are interrelated. Important ones are:

- ***Nang (honor)*:** Under this code, a tribesman is obliged to employ every means available to shield and protect himself, his honor and the honor of his family.
- ***Melmastia (hospitality)*:** Melmastia means the showing of hospitality to all visitors without hope of remuneration or favor. It is the hallmark of tribal social customs and traditions. It enjoins the obligation of protection. Anyone who can gain access to the house of a Pathan can claim asylum from the house, regardless of the previous relationship between them. Incidents have occurred where innocent men have died defending strangers, or even their own personal enemies, who demanded refuge while pursued by hostile forces. Tribal society's obligations of melmastia frequently led to difficulties under British rule. A classic case in point is melmastia for Osama Bin Laden, or for that matter proclaimed offenders from Pakistan, by the Taliban.
- ***Badal (revenge)*:** Badal permits no limits or limitation in time or space, regardless of cost or consequences. Blood feuds and enmities at times extend over generations. On the positive side, it is

¹¹⁶ James W. Spain, "Political Problems of a Borderland" in *Pakistan's Western Borderlands*, ed. Ainslee T. Embree (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1979), 4.

only because of these unremitting principles of revenge that crimes in the tribal areas are limited in number and extent.

- **Nanawatay (to seek forgiveness):** Nanawatay means to go in and seek forgiveness from the victim to whom a wrong has been done. It is used when the vanquished party is prepared to go into the house or hujra of his enemy to beg forgiveness and make peace with him, usually with the Holy Quran in hand. There is no nanawatay when the dispute involves tor, or black, i.e, is concerned with the dishonor of a woman. Tor can only be converted to speen, or white, by the victims on agreed conditions.
- **Tor (black):** Tor is a state of open guilt or infamy. It refers to those cases that are concerned with the honor of a woman. Tor can only be converted to speen by death. Because of the serious consequences involved, cases of adultery or illicit relations between sexes are extremely rare. It is important to underline that the only killing in tribal society that does not involve the law of revenge, is when a man and a woman having illicit relations are killed.
- **Tarboor (cousin):** This term is used for paternal cousins and has a connotation of cousin rivalry in Pukhtun customs and traditions. The tarboor may grow up as a childhood friend and become, in time, the chief rival for status and political leadership within the lineage. It is in this competition that *tarboorwali*, or cousin rivalry, exists and manifests itself in many a conflict in the tribal area.
- **Jirga (tribal council):** A jirga is an assembly of tribal elders who are called to decide specific issues and whose decision is binding on all parties in conflicts. As an institution, the jirga may pronounce penalties against persons or groups who do not submit to its decision. The jirga may also call for a *lashkar*, or tribal army, to implement its decision through force. Relations with the outside world are conducted through the jirga.
- **Lashkar or Lakhar (tribal army):** A body of tribesmen raised for an offensive purpose or to deal with a particular incident. The strength of tribalism is manifested in the institutions of the lashkar, which is primarily raised to enforce the decisions of the jirga. It may be raised against individuals, a group, or against the outside powers.
- **Teega or Kanrai:** A teega means a fixed date until which all hostilities between warring factions will be suspended. The jirga then ensures the implementation of a ceasefire. Any violation of the terms of truce, by any party, makes it liable to joint action by the jirga.

- **Badragga (tribal escort):** A tribal escort usually composed of members of that tribe through which travelers are passing. If a badragga is violated, a tribal feud will follow.
- **Hamsays:** A word used for client or dependent groups who attach themselves to larger or stronger maliks. An attack against hamsays is considered as an attack on the protector.
- **Muajib:** The yearly or semiannual fixed allowances paid by the political authorities to the tribe and its various sections.
- **Lungi:** Allowances given by the political authorities to individual maliks.
- **Nagha:** A tribal fine decided by a council of elders and imposed upon the wrongdoer. It is extracted, if necessary, by force.
- **Hujra:** A common sitting or sleeping place for males in the village. Visitors and unmarried young men sleep in the hujra. Expenses are usually shared by the village. Almost every hujra has a mosque attached. It is in the hujra that the hospitality of the Pathan is displayed.
- **Rawaj:** The Pathan's way of life is also governed by the rawaj or rawaj-i-am, customary law and by shariat, the Muslim law. Rawaj is more in use than the shariat and is generally preferred.
- **Malik:** Certain men are accepted as leaders and spokesmen for the group, on the basis of ability and experience. These are called maliks. A malik among the Pathans is at best, "first among equals." From the point of view of the political authorities, a malik may often be obscurantist and obdurate, opines Akbar S. Ahmed. His main objectives are then to maximize individual gains, not tribal gains. In the present times, with such vast development schemes afoot, the malik may well ignore tribal benefits to better his bargaining position vis-à-vis the political authorities. He may actually have two reasons for doing so. The first and obvious one is the expectation of monetary or other rewards. The second is more subtle. He feels that with any change in the status quo of the village, whether in the educational or economic spheres, there comes a corresponding change in his social position and political hegemony.

APPENDIX E. THE DURAND LINE AGREEMENT (1893)¹¹⁷

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part, whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and the Government of India, are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future, there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:

- The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement.
- The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
- The British Government thus agrees to His Highness, the Amir, retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand, that, he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajawar or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal Valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.
- The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map (not reproduced) attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

¹¹⁷ <http://www.khyber.org/pashtohistory/treaties/durandagreement.shtml>

- With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government, the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran Range near the Pasha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost, known locally, as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and turning southward, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

- The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier, and both the Governments of India and His Highness the Amir, undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible, all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.
- Being fully satisfied of His Highness' good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of ammunitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit, in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan H.M. Durand

Kabul

12 November 1893

APPENDIX F. AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN WITH THE TRIBAL PEOPLE (1951–1952)

Details of the agreement made by the Government of Pakistan with Tribal area inhabitants in 1951-52 are under¹¹⁸:

- We proclaim that our territory is an integral part of the dominion of Pakistan and we are citizens of Pakistan.
- We pledge our loyalty to the Constitution of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan as by law established.
- We shall remain peaceful and law abiding citizens of Pakistan and shall render every assistance to Government, whenever called upon to do so.
- We and our tribes shall have no dealings with any other power and the friends of Pakistan shall be our friends and the enemies of Pakistan shall be our enemies.
- We shall protect the rights and interests of Pakistan at all cost and shall faithfully abide by the directions given to us by the Government of Pakistan in this regard from time to time.
- We shall render every assistance to the officials of the Pakistan Government in our areas and shall ensure their safety.
- We shall facilitate the construction of roads, other public works, defence installations and establishment of communications in our areas and shall ensure the safety and protection of all Government property in our area. We shall also render every assistance to Government in the social and economic development of our area.
- In the internal affairs of our tribe, the Pakistan Government will ensure the maintenance of our tribal customs and usages and all our tribal matters and internal disputes shall be settled in accordance with our tribal customs and in consultation with and through our tribal leaders.
- The Government of Pakistan will continue to pay us our annual Muajib for the tribe and lungis for Maliks and representatives of our tribes. These grants will be subject to good behaviour and the fulfilment of the obligations detailed above, which our tribe has undertaken upon itself.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, States and Frontier Regions Division, (Islamabad: "S" Block, Pakistan Secretariat).

- We shall attend to all summons of the officers of the Pakistan Government and shall call on the Political Agent, to receive our annual Muajibs in the spring every year. If we fail to do so, the Muajibs for the year shall be forfeited to the Government of Pakistan.
- That, we shall abide by all the previous undertakings given and agreements made by us, from time to time, with the Government.

APPENDIX G. THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN, 1973 PROVISIONS ON THE TRIBAL AREAS

Articles discussed below provide the constitutional machinery behind the FATA.

A. Article 246 – Definition of Tribal Areas

Tribal Areas include the areas in Pakistan which, immediately before the commencing day, were tribal areas and include:

- The tribal areas of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province; and
- The former States of Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat.

B. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas include:

- The districts of Chitral, Dir and Swat (which includes Kalam) (the tribal area in Kohistan District) Malakand Protected Area, the tribal area adjoining Kala Dhaka (Mansehra District) and the former State of Amb; and
- Zhob District, Loralai District (Excluding Duki Tehsil), Dalbandin Tehsil of Chagai District and Marri and Bugti tribal territories of Sibi District.

C. Federally Administered Tribal Areas include:

- Tribal areas, adjoining Peshawar District;
- Tribal areas adjoining Kohat District;
- Tribal areas adjoining Bannu District;
- Tribal areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan District;
- Bajaur Agency;
- Mohmand Agency;
- Khyber Agency;
- Orakzai Agency;
- Khurram Agency;
- North Waziristan Agency; and

- South Waziristan Agency.

D. Article 247 - Administration of Tribal Areas

Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the executive authority of a Province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Area therein.

- The President may, from time to time, give such directions to the Governor of a province relating to the whole or any part of a Tribal Area within the province as he may deem necessary, and the Government shall, in the exercise of his function under this Article, comply with such directions.
- *No act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the president so directs, and no Act of Majlis-e-Shoora or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or to any part thereof, unless the Government to the Province in which the Tribal Area is situated, with the approval of the President, so directed; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the president or, as the case may be, the Government may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part therefore, have effect subject to such exceptions and modification as may be specified in the direction.*
- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the President may, with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of Majlis-e-Shoora, and the Government of a province, with the prior approval of the president, may with respect to any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly make regulation for the peace and good government of a provincially Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof, situated in the Province.
- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the president may, with respect to any matter, make regulation for the peace and good government of a Federally Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof.
- The President may, at any time, by Order, direct that the whole or any part of a Tribal Area shall cease to be Tribal Area, and such Order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary and proper provided that before making any Order under this clause, the president shall ascertain in such manner as he considers appropriate, the views of

the people of the Tribal Area concerned, as represented in Tribal Jirga.

- Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any Jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless Mujlis-e-Shoora by law otherwise provides.

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APPENDIX H. PROBLEM AREAS IN FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATIONS 1901

The FCR, formulated by the British to exercise control over the tribal areas was regarded as Black Law. The major problem areas in the FCR is as follows¹¹⁹:

- Under the FCR, the presence of lawyers is not permitted. The parties have a right to address the Jirga themselves. The legal profession opposes the FCR and is attacked by them for being Black Law.
- According to subsection (4) of Section 1, there are some special and discriminatory provisions that are applicable only to Pathans and Balochs.
- Under Clause 40, the political agent can ask anyone to provide security, if it is determined by him that this would prevent murder, or sedition. If a person fails to do so or the political agent finds the securities inadequate, the targeted person may be imprisoned for three years. Such a period of imprisonment can be extended to a total of six years. It is for the political agent to decide whether the imprisonment is to be simple or rigorous.
- The object classification of a tribesman as almost a subhuman is tragic. He may be killed and no questions are asked since the FCR permits it [S.38 (4)].
- No judicial oversight is permitted, since there is a bar to the jurisdiction of superior courts.
- The administration has been enabled to enter the honor code of Pashtunwali and has thus opened itself as possible party against whom *badal*, or revenge, can be taken.
- The FCR goes into the concept of Melmastia. If refuge has been given, compliance with government demands to renege would insult the honor of a tribesman and/or clan.
- Clauses 21-26 of FCR denote the concept of collective/territorial responsibility where whole communities can be held responsible and punished for an attempted or committed crime.

¹¹⁹ Amir Muhammad Khan, "Justice Denied," <http://www.newslines.com.pk/NewsDec2004/newsbeat1dec.htm>, internet, July 31, 2005.

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APPENDIX I. DETAILS OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN

- The Devolution Plan will be extended and local government institutions will be established, before the October 2002 general election or at March 2003.
- Agency Nazim, to be an elected representative of the tribal population, will head each local government in the tribal areas. The present role of the Political Agent will be drastically changed from that of very powerful administrator to a coordinator.
- Necessary amendments will be made in the Frontier Crimes Regulations to give the right of appeal and of review to the people; the harsh provisions of what is considered as a draconian law imposed by the British to suppress the tribal people will be abolished.
- FATA will not be converted into a separate province at this stage to avoid possible disorder. It was decided that the tribal culture and customs of the local population would be fully protected and secured and the existing policy of integration through development would continue.
- The financial powers of the Governor NWFP will be increased and his Secretariat will be strengthened to ensure the development process in the tribal areas.
- Levies and Khasadars should be better trained and equipped to effectively control the situation in the tribal areas.
- FATA should be given representation in the NWFP provincial assembly through allocation of extra seats. The representation of FATA in the National Assembly and the Senate will, remain unchanged.
- Special development packages for the tribal areas will be introduced to bring them up to par with the settle areas.

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APPENDIX J. SUMMARY OF SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS

Serial Number	Item	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA	% of Pakistan
1	Cultivated area (million hectares)	21.9	17	0.2	0.8
2	Population per cultivated hectare	6	10	17	283.3
3	Irrigated area (million hectares)	18.2	0.9	0.1	0.6
4	Population per irrigated hectare	7	21	32	457.1
5	Forested area (million hectares)	3.6	1.3	0	0.9
6	Literacy rate	45	37.3	17.4	
7	Male	56.5	52.8	29.5	
8	Female	32.6	21.1	3	
9	Participation rate (primary)	77	64.5	N/A	
10	Population per hospital bed	1450	1869	2327	160.5

Table 4. Summary of Socioeconomic Indicators

Sources:

1. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

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APPENDIX K. COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE FATA

Item	Year	Unit	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
COMMUNICATION						
Post Offices	1999-2000	Number	12854	1990	195	1.5
Telegraph Offices	1999-2000	-do-	384	44	4	1.04
Telephone	-do-	-do-	3124000	316820	24283	0.8
TV Sets	1998	-do-	273620	60665	76	0.03
Population per Telephone	-do-	Persons	44	59	136	-
Population per Post Office	-do-	-do-	10	9	17	-
ROADS						
Total	1999-2000	km	248340	10134	4417	1.8
High Type	-do-	-do-	138200	7431	2592	1.9
Low Type	-do-	-do-	110140	2703	1825	1.7
Road per sq km of area	-do-	-do-	0.31	0.13	0.16	-

Table 5. Communication Infrastructure of FATA

Notes:

1. Road kilometer data of NWFP for the year 1998-99.
2. The Pakistan road km figures are Provisional.

Sources:

1. General Manager Northern Telecommunication Region, Peshawar & D.I. Khan.
2. Post Master General, North Western Circle, Peshawar.
3. Pakistan Television Corporation, Islamabad.
4. Chief Engineer, C.D.O. Office C&W Department, Govt. of NWFP.
5. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2000-2001.
6. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX K.




Figure 6. Comparison of Communication Infrastructure, Telephones and Post Offices




Figure 7. Road Network (roads per sq km of area)

APPENDIX L. LITERACY AND EDUCATION FACILITIES IN THE FATA

Item	Pakistan (P)	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
A. Educational Institutions (number of students)			
Primary Schools Total	162500	3276	2.02
Male	104900	2120	2.02
Female	57600	1156	2.01
Middle Schools Total	18400	347	1.88
Male	10300	259	2.51
Female	8100	88	1.08
High Schools Total	12600	201	1.6
Male	8000	183	2.28
Female	4600	18	0.39
Inter & Degree Colleges Total	853	9	1.06
Male	509	9	1.76
Female	344	-	-
B. Enrollment (by level) (nos)			
Primary Schools Total	20399000	266713	1.3
Male	11720000	205749	1.76
Female	8679000	60964	0.7
Middle Schools Total	4338000	40949	0.94
Male	2631000	37158	1.41
Female	1707000	3791	0.22
High Schools Total	1795000	15166	0.84
Male	1105000	13985	1.26
Female	690000	1181	0.17
Inter & Degree Colleges Total	791000	3007	0.38
Male	435000	3007	0.69
Female	356000	-	-

Table 6. Details of Literacy and Education Facilities in FATA

Item	Pakistan (P)	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
C. Teaching Staff (nos)			
Primary Schools Total	373900	8988	2.4
Male	236000	5982	2.53
Female	137900	3006	2.18
Middle Schools Total	92300	3588	3.88
Male	45800	2777	6.06
Female	46500	811	1.74
High Schools Total	202900	3711	1.82
Male	131600	3401	2.58
Female	71300	310	0.43
Inter & Degree Colleges Total	26942	233	0.86
Male	16599	233	1.4
Female	10343	-	-
D. Literacy Ratio (%)	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA
Both Sexes	45	37.3	17.42
Male	56.5	52.8	29.51
Female	32.6	21.1	3

Table 6. Details of Literacy and Education Facilities in FATA (cont.)

Notes:

1. Mosque Schools are included in Primary Schools.
2. Data was obtained in 1999-2000.

Sources:

1. Directorate of Education (FATA) Government of NWFP.
2. Pakistan Economic Survey, 2001-2002.
3. Provisional Census Reports of Pakistan & FATA.
4. Census Report of FATA, 1998.
5. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX L.




Figure 8. Comparison of Literacy Rates

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APPENDIX M. DETAILS OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN FATA

Items	Year/Period	Unit	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
Institutions					
Hospitals	1999-2000	Number	876	42	4.8
Dispensaries	-do-	-do-	4635	170	3.7
Maternity & Child Health Centre	-do-	-do-	856	17	2
Medical Personnel					
Doctors	1999-2000	-do-	91823	408	0.4
Nurses	-do-	-do-	37623	69	0.2
Lady Health Visitors	-do-	-do-	5619	132	2.3
Beds Strength					
Total Beds	-do-	-do-	93907	1263	1.3
Selected Ratios					
Population per Bed	1999-2000	Persons	1495	2645	
Population per Doctor	-do-	-do-	1529	8189	

Table 7. Details of Health Facilities in the FATA

Sources:

1. Economic Survey 2000-2001.
2. Directorate of Health Services, FATA, NWFP, Peshawar.
3. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX M.




Figure 9. Comparison of Health Facilities in Pakistan and FATA

APPENDIX N. ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OF FATA FROM 1997 TO 2001

Sector Details of FATA	1997-98 Million Rs	1998-99 Million Rs	1999-2000 Million Rs	2000-2001 Million Rs
Agriculture	30.698	30.308	27.223	24
Forest	54.402	61.318	66.054	65
Power	28.5	53.85	38.073	36
Communication	219	251.79	272.229	291
Public Health Engineering	155.521	89.332	97.527	115
Housing	18.955	34.806	35.016	20
Education	181.861	185.541	195.512	214
Health	107.478	118.279	107.467	159
Rural Development	13.458	33.299	26.456	20
Research & Development	6.039	19.498	11.243	9
Regional Development	37	45	46.221	62
Total	855	923.021	923.021	1015

Table 8. Annual Development Programme of FATA from 1997 to 2001

Sources:

1. ADP of FATA issued by Chief FATA, P&D Department, NWFP.
2. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

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APPENDIX O. DETAILS OF AGRICULTURE IN FATA

Item	Year	Unit	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
Farms Total	1990	Number	5075.7	178.1	3.5
Government Farms	-do-	-do-	0.2	0.02	10
Private Farms	-do-	-do-	5075.5	178	3.5
Under 1.0 Acre	-do-	-do-	389.1	26.4	6.8
1.0 under 2.5 Acres	-do-	-do-	979.9	46.5	4.7
2.5 under 5.0 Acres	-do-	-do-	1043.2	39.1	3.7
5.0 under 7.5 Acres	-do-	-do-	839.5	26.1	3.1
7.5 under 12.5 Acres	-do-	-do-	857.9	20.9	2.4
12.5 under 25.0 Acres	-do-	-do-	619.9	11.6	1.9
25.0 under 50.0 Acres	-do-	-do-	237.0	5.2	2.2
50.0 under 150.0 Acres	-do-	-do-	93.5	2	2.1
150.0 and above	-do-	-do-	15.5	0.2	1.3
Farms Area Total	-do-	Acres	47616.2	1124.4	2.4
Government Farms Area	-do-	-do-	182.4	0.2	0.1
Private Farms Area	-do-	-do-	47433.8	1124.2	2.4

Table 9. Details of Agriculture in FATA

Sources:

1. Pakistan Census of Agriculture 1990, Preliminary Report.
2. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

EXHIBIT 1 TO APPENDIX O.

Item	Year	Unit	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
Geographical Area	1999-2000	Million Hectares	79.61	2.72	3.4
Reported Area	-do-	-do-	59.28	2.72	4.6
Cultivated Area	-do-	-do-	21.99	0.18	0.9
Net Sown Area	-do-	-do-	16.32	0.17	1
Current Fallow	-do-	-do-	5.67	0.02	0.4
Total Cropped Area	-do-	-do-	22.76	0.24	1.1
Uncultivated	-do-	-do-	36.92	2.53	6.9
Forest Area	-do-	-do-	3.66	0.03	0.8
Culturable Waste	-do-	-do-	9.13	0.18	2
Not available for cultivation	-do-	-do-	24.50	2.32	9.5
Area sown more than once	-do-	-do-	6.44	0.7	1.1
Irrigated	-do-	-do-	18.09	0.1	0.6

Table 10. Details of Land Utilization in FATA

Sources:

1. Director Agriculture Statistics, NWFP, Peshawar.
2. Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 1999-2000.
3. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

EXHIBIT 2 TO APPENDIX O.




Figure 10. Summary of Land Utilization in FATA

EXHIBIT 3 TO APPENDIX O.

Item	Year	Unit	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as % Share of Pakistan
Wheat	1999-2000	Tonnes	21079	113.1	0.5
Rice	-do-	-do-	5556	17.5	0.3
Jowar	-do-	-do-	220	0.5	0.2
Bajra	-do-	-do-	156	-	-
Maize	-do-	-do-	1652	68.3	4.1
Sugar Cane	-do-	-do-	46333	79	0.2
Barley	-do-	-do-	118	18.2	15.4
Gram	-do-	-do-	565	1.6	0.3
Mustard	-do-	-do-	297	2.2	0.7
Sesamum	-do-	-do-	35	-	-
Cotton	-do-	-do-	1912	-	-
Tobacco	-do-	-do-	108	-	-
Fertilizer/off take	-do-	Tonnes	2832	14.5	0.5

Table 11. Production of Major Crops in FATA

Sources:

1. Director Agriculture Statistics, NWFP, Peshawar.
2. Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 1999-2000.
3. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

APPENDIX P. DETAILS OF LIVESTOCK IN FATA

1996 Census Figures				
Item	Unit	Pakistan	FATA	FATA as % share of Pakistan
Cattle	In millions	20.4	1	4.9
Buffaloes	-do-	20.3	0.1	0.5
Sheep	-do-	23.5	1.4	6
Goats	-do-	41.2	2.2	5.3

Table 12. Details of Livestock in FATA

Sources:

1. Census of Livestock of NWFP 1996.
2. Bureau of Statistics, Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP.

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APPENDIX Q. SUMMARY – FATA DEVELOPMENT WORKS

Ser	Projects	Planned	Completed	Under Construction
1	Roads	606 km	435.199 km	171.801 km
2	Schools	19	15	4
3	Basic Health Units (BHU)	2	2	-
4	Water Supply Schemes (WSS)	14	6	8
5	Tube Wells (TW)	5	3	2
6	Dug Wells (DW)	12	2	10
7	Hand Pumps (HP)	128	115	13
8	Micro Hydal Power Station (MHP)	4	2	2

Table 13. Development Works Undertaken by the Army

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